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Mowing the Playing Field:
Addressing Information Distortion
and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game
Paul J. Healdt
The TRIPS Agreement,1 which mandates minimum inter-
national standards for the protection of intellectual property,
provides the rules for a fascinating game between industrial-
ized and developing nations. Since the conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round in 1995, all members of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) are required to participate in the game, and even
the poorest countries are willing to take the field as the price of
joining an organization whose professed goal is lowering trade
barriers and eliminating regimes of unilateral trade sanctions.
On one side, the rational strategy of the highly industrialized
nations which designed the game2 is clear-convince the two-
thirds of the WTO that qualify as "developing countries" 3 to
t Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia. Many thanks to
Graeme Dinwoodie, Kenneth Port, David Mustard, Jerry Reichman, John L.
Turner, Fred Yen, and participants at the Vanderbilt Law School "Dean's
Luncheon" paper series for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (establishing minimum
standards of protection of copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets,
and making WTO dispute resolution mechanisms available to intellectual
property enforcement disputes between members states).
2. See Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual
Property Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 771-76 (2002) (not-
ing predominance of the United States, European Union, Canada, and Japan
in the negotiations leading to the TRIPS Agreement and emphasizing the role
of threatened unilateral sanctions by the United States to obtain acquiescence
of important developing countries).
3. See World Trade Organization: Trade Topics Development Definitions,
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/dlwhoe.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2003). The WTO does not define the term "developing countries" as it ap-
pears in the TRIPS Agreement. Id.; see also Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Im-
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maximize their enforcement of intellectual property rights. For
technologically advanced nations (usually net exporters of
copyrighted materials and patented products), the reduction of
piracy, counterfeiting, and other uncompensated uses has obvi-
ous pecuniary advantages. The rational response of the devel-
oping world is less obvious.
Most developing countries want access to the markets that
membership in the WTO promises to open,4 but compliance
with the TRIPS Agreement imposes significant administrative
and enforcement costs. 5 These costs vary widely with the
unique economic circumstances of each complying country, but
the short-term consumer costs of complying with the TRIPS
Agreement are easy to see.6 In countries with substantial mar-
kets for newly protected pharmaceuticals and agricultural
products (like Brazil, India, and South Africa), enforcement of
patents means higher prices for drugs, seeds, and fertilizers.7
In countries where bootleg music, movies, and software are
cheap and plentiful, the effect of strict enforcement of copyright
law on prices is also easy to predict.8 Developing countries that
pact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, 31
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1245, 1280 (1994). Instead of "developing countries," I
would prefer to use a term with less political baggage, but, for the purposes of
this Article, feel constrained by its use within the TRIPS Agreement.
4. See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate
Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11,
17 (1998) ("[Dleveloping countries were offered greater access to markets for
traditional manufactured goods and for their agricultural products in ex-
change for codified obligations to respect intellectual property rights.").
5. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 15-23 (assuming existence of an
office for the registration of trademarks); id. arts. 27-34 (assuming the exis-
tence of a patent office); id. arts. 41-61 (mandating fair and equitable en-
forcement procedures, special border measures, and criminal remedies); see
also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD),
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 19-20, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/1, U.N. Sales No. 96.II.D.10 (1996) [hereinafter UNCTAD] (dis-
cussing the "direct costs" stemming from the TRIPS Agreement, including
administrative costs); Carlos M. Correa, New International Standards for In-
tellectual Property: Impact on Technology Flows and Innovation in Developing
Countries, 24 SCI. & PUB. POLY 79, 85 (1997) (discussing administrative costs
of implementing the TRIPS Agreement).
6. See Correa, supra note 5, at 85 ("In the case of countries with low in-
dustrial development, the main impact of the TRIPs Agreement in the short
and medium term will be on market prices.").
7. See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 15.
8. See id. at 15-16 (discussing competition spurred by intellectual prop-
erty rights and implications of TRIPS on pricing and licensing terms); KEITH
E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 6, 158
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consume counterfeit trademarked goods will also see prices rise
if only authentic goods may be legally sold. Obviously, in devel-
oping countries with significant manufacturing capacity, a di-
rect economic cost is imposed by the closing of plants producing
previously unprotected pharmaceuticals and agricultural prod-
ucts, bootleg compact discs and movies, and knockoff clothing.9
The temptation to persist in reaping the harvest of outside in-
ventiveness and creativity is wholly rational.
Not surprisingly, the advice offered by industrialized na-
tions de-emphasizes the cost of compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement. The rhetoric suggests that the game is cooperative,
that enforcement of high intellectual property standards is in
the best interests of all the players. The most common sugges-
tion is that stimulating local creativity and attracting direct
foreign investment offer compelling reasons for developing
countries to embrace the TRIPS Agreement. 0 What usually
goes unspoken is that the TRIPS Agreement leaves significant
(2000). In Eastern Europe, over eighty percent of all software is used without
a proper license. Fred M. Greguras, 1997 Update: International Legal Protec-
tion for Software, in COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION 1997, at 855, 862 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property, Course Handbook
Series No. G-479, 1997).
9. See MASKUS, supra note 8, at 157-59 (discussing a Lebanese model of
the market effects on labor and employment of the TRIPS Agreement). In the
least developed countries, where significant manufacturing capacity is absent
and consumers lack the disposable income to purchase patented inventions,
software, and copyrighted artworks, the cost of augmented intellectual prop-
erty rights may initially be minimal, although protection afforded to foreign
rights holders may make future acquisition of technology more expensive.
10. See Bronckers, supra note 3, at 1278-79 ("Nowadays it is more com-
mon currency to think that IP protection can contribute to the economic pro-
gress of developing countries, notably by encouraging technology transfers and
foreign investments."); Correa, supra note 5, at 85 ("The proposal of new in-
ternational rules on TRIPS in the Uruguay Round has been premised on the
assumption that a strengthened protection of IPRs would promote foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) flows and the transfer of technology to developing coun-
tries."); Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Develop-
ing Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 544 (1997) (studying the possible benefits to
developing countries of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and ex-
plaining that "it can be expected that developing countries will experience the
solid economic benefits which flow from robust protection of intellectual prop-
erty" once an adequate public administration is put in place); Wendy S.
Vicente, A Questionable Victory for Coerced Argentine Pharmaceutical Patent
Legislation, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1101, 1120-26 (1998) (discussing the
case for strong intellectual property rights and stating that "U.S. coercion to
upgrade foreign intellectual property protection paternalistically promises to
improve foreign investment prospects"); see also UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 1-
4 (providing main findings and conclusions regarding the costs and benefits of
the TRIPS Agreement).
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room for a complying WTO member to make choices about its
level of intellectual property protection. Those arguing for re-
gimes of maximum protection claim that "[t] he higher the intel-
lectual property protection the greater amount of investment,"'
and even assert that "the TRIPS level of protection is probably
not sufficiently robust."2 This Article challenges the economic
logic of the maximum enforcement claim and suggests that a
rational, self-interested approach taken by a developing coun-
try would seek to minimize the costs of complying with TRIPS
while maximizing the potential for necessary technological de-
velopment. One article cannot hope to level the playing field be-
tween industrialized and developing nations, but it may be able
to cut down some of the tall grass growing on the side of the
pitch where developing nations usually play, back by their own
goal. This tall grass distorts a clear view of the rational options
and agendas available to the developing world.
In the context of this Article, better groundskeeping in the
TRIPS game means improving the quality of information avail-
able to developing countries. First, economic information can be
improved by demystifying the canonical work inevitably cited
for the proposition that a developing country will stimulate for-
eign direct investment and technology transfer by increasing
its intellectual property protection. It is difficult to over-
estimate the influence of Edwin Mansfield's 1994 paper' 3 for
the International Finance Corporation (an arm of the World
Bank), but close scrutiny reveals that its findings have been
consistently misread. Second, the TRIPS Agreement itself
needs to be re-examined in order to reveal the full panoply of
compliance options it offers developing countries. Finally, a ra-
tional strategy for developing countries must not only consider
compliance options, but must also account for institutional
competency-legislative, judicial, executive, and diplomatic-in
order to make the most of available options.
Part I explains why the developing world should be skepti-
cal of the persistent claim based on Mansfield's research that
11. Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Inno-
vation: TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 375-76 (2000-2001).
12. Robert M. Sherwood, Global Prospects for the Role of Intellectual Prop-
erty in Technology Transfer, 42 IDEA 27, 30 (2002).
13. EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (Int'l Fin. Corp., Discus-
sion Paper No. 19, 1994).
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maximum enforcement of intellectual property laws will lead to
foreign direct investment and technology transfer. Mansfield's
landmark survey of American business executives does not
support a maximalist strategy across all areas of intellectual
property. The following sections examine options available to
the policy makers in developing countries that are most likely
to be involved in securing compliance with the TRIPS Agree-
ment. Part II looks through the legislative lens and explores
the numerous statutory options available to capture welfare
benefits offered by intellectual property while reducing the cost
to consumers and local industry of complying with the TRIPS
Agreement. Part III proposes a role for the judiciary in realiz-
ing legislative initiatives. The executive branch, however con-
stituted, is considered in Part IV. Given chronic weaknesses in
the judicial systems in many developing countries, problems
that are typically handled by courts in the United States or the
European Union may be more productively addressed else-
where by specialized agencies. Finally, Part V explores the
critical diplomatic perspective and, borrowing from the work of
Professors Reichman and Lange, suggests strategic initiatives
that may enable a nation to "bargain around the TRIPS
Agreement."14 Even if new intellectual property laws do not
stimulate investment in, or technology transfer to, a developing
country, public/private partnerships have the potential to lev-
erage significant economic benefits.
TRIPS leaves room for substantial maneuvering. An inte-
grated approach involving all facets of policy making is central
to establishing a rational intellectual property policy in any
country. One advantage of examining the TRIPS Agreement
from distinct legislative, judicial, executive (or agency), and
diplomatic perspectives is what it can reveal about ineffective
or nonexistent governmental structures in the developing
world. The approach taken here not only directly examines the
substance of rational intellectual property policy, but also indi-
rectly addresses the structure of effective law making and en-
forcement.
I. RATIONAL SKEPTICISM
OF THE WESTERN SALES PITCH
In crafting their TRIPS compliance strategies, developing
countries would like the answer to two important questions: (1)
14. See Reichman & Lange, supra note 4, at 11.
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will the costs of enforcing intellectual property rights be offset
by a stimulus to local creativity? and (2) will those costs be off-
set by increased foreign direct investment and technology
transfer? The first question is famously impossible to answer
and cannot be addressed in this Article.' 5 An answer to the sec-
ond question has been more confidently asserted. Relying on
the research of Edwin Mansfield, 16 many commentators have
been willing to draw a correlation between enforcing intellec-
tual property rights and increasing foreign direct investment
and technology transfer to developing countries." For example,
15. Economists are not even sure that American patent law is welfare en-
hancing:
[I]f we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to rec-
ommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a
long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowl-
edge, to recommend abolishing it.
FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY No.
15 OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), cited in Ed-
mund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 289 n.72 (1977) ("[Malchup's] study remains authoritative."). As recently
as 1970, Professor (now Justice) Stephen Breyer opined that copyright law
was not needed for books. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:
A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970). There seems to be a growing consensus that
patent protection does stimulate creative activity in the more highly industri-
alized developing nations, such as Brazil. See MASKUS, supra note 8, at 147-
49.
16. See MANSFIELD, supra note 13.
17. See Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual
Property Rights in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
CHINA 7, 8 (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997) (listing the loss of foreign investment and
know-how as a cost of counterfeiting); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS:
NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 214
(1998) (arguing that an operational intellectual property regime will promote
foreign investment); Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Coun-
tries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 175-76 (1994) (same); Owen Lippert, One
Trip to the Dentist Is Enough: Reasons to Strengthen Intellectual Property
Rights Through the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 9 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 248 (1998) (recognizing the pioneering work of
Edwin Mansfield and noting that "[i]n the last twenty years... numerous
studies have sought to measure the effect of changes in IPR standards on such
items as economic growth, foreign direct investment ("FDI"), technology trans-
fer, and consumer welfare" (citations omitted)); Clarisa Long, Patents and
Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 229, 238 (2000) (reporting on
a survey showing that "eighty percent of firms surveyed in the chemical,
transportation equipment, electrical equipment, food, metals, and machinery
industries indicated that the strength of intellectual property protection had a
'major effect' in their willingness to invest in research and development facili-
ties abroad" (citations omitted)); Sherwood, supra note 12, at 27; Singham, su-
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Peter Yu cites Mansfield for the proposition that "adopting an
intellectual property regime that harmonizes with Western no-
tions... will increase foreign investment, thus creating new
jobs and facilitating technology transfer."18 Similarly, "[miost
writers [such as Mansfield] who have examined the role of in-
tellectual property protection in developing countries have ar-
gued that better protection generally has positive economic ef-
fects, whether measured in terms of increased foreign direct
investment or rates of modernization and development." 9 Reli-
ance on Mansfield is predictable and persistent,2 ° including un-
questioned citation by famous skeptics of the proposition that
intellectual property enforcement levels matter in investment
decisions .1
pra note 11, at 375 ("Mansfield's work illustrates that the intellectual property
protection afforded by a country directly relates to the amount of technical de-
velopment and transfer into the developing country .... Countries with strong
intellectual property protection tend to experience a continuing flow of new
high technology firms entering the industrial base." (citations omitted)); Hora-
cio Teran, Intellectual Property Protection and Offshore Software Development:
An Analysis of the U.S. Software Industry, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 1-2
(2001), available at http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v2nl/teran.pdf.; John A. Tes-
sensohn, Reversal of Fortune-Pharmaceutical Experimental Use and Patent
Infringement in Japan, 4 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (1998) ("The importance
of providing strong protection of intellectual property rights in the ethical
pharmaceutical industry can never be underestimated. The International Fi-
nance Corporation ... discovered that pharmaceutical companies would not be
willing to invest directly in research and development facilities if there were
no patent protection available for their ... products."); Kenneth J. Vandvelde,
The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621,
638 n.163 (1998) ("In general, strong intellectual property protection is corre-
lated with the attraction of foreign direct investment."); Peter Yu, Piracy,
Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the
U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 62-63 (2001);
Evelyn Su, Comment, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing
Countries, 23 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 169, 217 (2000) ("The report finds that by
strengthening protection on the intellectual property rights, there may be a
positive impact on developing countries through increases in local' innovation,
foreign direct investment, and technology transfers." (citations omitted)); Josh
Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COM., Mar.
7, 1996, at 1C (reporting on a "World Bank survey" that demonstrates the cor-
relation between intellectual property rights and foreign investment).
Note also that a Google search of "Mansfield" and "foreign direct invest-
ment" on October 9, 2002, returned approximately 1200 hits.
18. Yu, supra note 17, at 62-63 (citations omitted).
19. Teran, supra note 17, at 1-2.
20. See sources cited supra note 17.
21. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic De-
velopment, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INVL L. 471, 484 (2000) ("Firms with easily cop-
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Although authoritatively establishing or disproving a
causal link between strong intellectual property rights and for-
eign direct investment is a complex econometric exercise be-
yond the scope of this Article, a closer look at the famous Mans-
field paper can reduce the amount of noise in the current
debate and improve the quality of economic information avail-
able to policy makers in developing countries. In 1991, Mans-
field surveyed one hundred U.S. firms in six different indus-
tries: chemical, transportation equipment, electrical equip-
ment, food, metals, and machinery. 2 An astonishing ninety-
four firms responded to questions about whether the "strength
or weakness of intellectual property rights protection has a
strong effect on whether direct investments will be made."23
The results were summarized as follows:2"
ied products and technologies ... would be quite concerned about the ability of
the local IPRS system to deter imitation. Firms considering investing in a local
R&D facility would pay particular attention to local patent and trade-secrets
protection. This perspective was borne out by Mansfield.... ."); Keith E. Mas-
kus, Lessons from Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2219, 2233 (2000) (explaining that in a recent
study based on an econometric model, "the authors found that weak patents
had a significantly negative impact on the location of American FDI"); J.H.
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 81 n.271 (1997) ("The
availability of legal protection seems to affect all the principal methods by
which developing countries obtain advanced technology they are not able to
produce themselves, including foreign direct investment, joint ventures, tech-
nology transfers to subsidiaries, and licensing or franchises.").
22. MANSFIELD, supra note 13, at 1.
23. Id. at 1, 3.
24. Id. at 3 ("The number of firms in the sample in each industry is
chemical [including pharmaceuticals], 16; transportation equipment, 6; elec-
trical equipment, 35; food, 8; metals, 5; machinery, 24.").
256
ASYMMETRY IN THE TRIPS GAME
Table 1-Major U.S. Firms in Six Industries Where Strength or
Weakness of Intellectual Property Rights Protection Has Strong
Effect on Whether Direct Investments Will Be Made, 1991
(numbers shown in percent)
Industry Sales & Rudimen- Facilities Facilities Research Mean
Distribu- tary Pro- to Manu- to Manu- & Devel-
tion Out- duction & facture facture opment
lets Assembly Compo- Complete Facilities
Facilities nents Products
Chemical 19 46 71 87 100 65
Trans. Equip. 17 17 33 33 80 36
Elec. Equip. 15 40 57 74 80 53
Food 29 29 25 43 60 37
Metals 20 40 50 50 80 48
Machinery 23 23 50 65 77 48
Mean 20 32 48 59 80 48
After speculating on why the attitudes of the various in-
dustries studied diverged so widely, and presenting statements
from interviewees, Mansfield concluded that "the strength or
weakness of a country's system of intellectual property protec-
tion seems to have a substantial effect, particularly in high-
technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred by
many U.S. firms to that country."25 Although several commen-
tators doubt the substantiality of this link, 6 I have found no se-
rious challenges to Mansfield's research.
Although the rigor of Mansfield's survey technique might
be criticized on several grounds, 7 the real problem is how it is
interpreted by scholars and policy makers who recommend
maximum recognition of patent rights or, more broadly, strong
25. Id. at 1.
26. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
27. It is unclear from the article whether the survey was directed to the
manager within the firm in charge of foreign direct investment decisions. In
addition, when asked whether the firm would invest in a particular country,
the question was not validated with another question testing the interviewee's
level of knowledge of intellectual property protection in the respective country.
Finally, it appears that the interviewees were not questioned about their un-
derstanding of the term "intellectual property," which could encompass pat-
ents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, publicity rights, sui generis design
rights, or a subset of this list.
2003]
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enforcement of intellectual property rights across the board.2"
To begin, one must note that Mansfield did not ask firms sepa-
rately about the relevance of each category of intellectual prop-
erty. For instance, he did not present questions regarding the
distinct relevance of the enforcement of patents, trademarks,
copyrights, trade secrets, publicity rights, or other sui generis
design rights,29 but asked only generically about "intellectual
property rights" as a group. To understand why this matters, it
is useful to disaggregate a theoretical firm into two divisions
that investigate levels of intellectual property protection. Divi-
sion one is concerned with where to locate manufacturing and
research and development facilities, and the other with where
to market finished products.
Consider first the marketing division of MegaCorp. As
noted earlier, owners of patented inventions, trademarks (espe-
cially prestigious marks on consumer goods), and copyrights
(especially computer software) prefer to have exclusive rights to
market their products. The ability to suppress some forms of
competition can increase a firm's profits. For this reason, com-
plaints about the costs of piracy and counterfeiting are com-
monplace. In fact, complaints by U.S., Japanese, and E.U. firms
provided the main stimulus for the adoption of the TRIPS
Agreement." Therefore, we would expect the marketing divi-
sion of MegaCorp to be very concerned about the level of protec-
tion for patented, trademarked, and copyrighted products that
it would like to sell in a developing country.
The research and manufacturing divisions of MegaCorp,
however, have a different set of concerns about the level of in-
tellectual property protection in foreign jurisdictions where it is
considering investing. For example, even under the TRIPS
Agreement, protection for a trade secret is lost when it is re-
vealed to the public.3' In other words, if a developing country
does not adequately protect secret processes, devices, and
know-how, or provides no means to protect investments in
training local employees by enforcing restrictive covenants,
then some kinds of foreign direct investment may be deterred.
If locating in a developing country means that valuable infor-
28. See suprh notes 17-19.
29. U.S. law, for example, provides special protection beyond traditional
copyright or patent law for semiconductors, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (2000), and
boat hulls, id. §§ 1301-32.
30. See Drahos, supra note 2, at 769-73.
31. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.
258 [Vol 88:249
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mation or technology will be appropriated or disclosed due to
poor enforcement of trade secrecy or contract law, then invest-
ment decisions may be affected.
The same logic, however, does not apply to decisions to
move manufacturing or research facilities to developing coun-
tries that fail to protect patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
By definition, patent and trademark law only protect inven-
tions and symbols that have been fully disclosed to the public.
This is also true of the main commercial objects of copyright
protection: movies, books, compact discs, and computer pro-
32grams. Moving a research and development facility to a coun-
try without patent, trademark, or copyright law does not in-
crease a firm's risk of damaging disclosures or increase its cost
of doing business.33 In the absence of involuntary disclosure
fears, MegaCorp's research and manufacturing divisions should
be relatively indifferent to the level of patent, trademark, and
copyright protection found in a developing country. Its manu-
facturing decisions should instead be driven by "location advan-
tages," such as "transport costs and distance from markets, low
wage costs in relation to labor productivity, [access to] abun-
dant natural resources, and trade protection that could encour-
age tariff jumping investments."34 Similarly, a decision about
where to locate research facilities usually depends primarily on
the level of education and training of the local workforce, the
condition of its financial sector,35 the health of its legal system,36
and the transparency of governmental procedures.37
32. Copyright law does protect unpublished works like diaries and com-
puter source code, but not from mere disclosure. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-07
(2000). In other words, trade secret law, not copyright law, is the main vehicle
for protecting valuable unpublished works from disclosure, as opposed to copy-
ing.
33. In fact, to the extent that licenses need not be obtained from other in-
tellectual property owners, the cost of doing business may be reduced.
34. Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encour-
aging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 109, 123 (1998).
35. See Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance, Entrepreneurship, and
Growth: Theory and Evidence, 32 J. MONETARY ECON. 513 (1993) (stating that
growth in gross domestic product is strongly correlated to the stability and
health of a country's financial sector).
36. See Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 8 (1999) (correlating strength of legal system with economic
growth); Ross Levine, The Legal Environment, Banks and Long-Run Economic
Growth, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 596 (1998) (same).
37. See Maskus, supra note 34, at 123; see also ASSAFA ENDESHAW,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 104
20031 259
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If MegaCorp's primary markets are the United States, Ja-
pan, and the European Union, then its decision whether to lo-
cate its newest research or manufacturing facility in Lebanon
should not turn on the state of Lebanese patent law. Lebanese
patent law is irrelevant to the enforceability of MegaCorp's
monopoly rights in its important markets,38 even if invention
occurs in Lebanon. For example, a patent may be granted and
enforced in the United States (or any other WTO member) re-
gardless of where invention occurs. The absence of Lebanese
patent law merely means the loss of potential market power
within the borders of that country, a concern for MegaCorp's
marketing department, but not its R&D division.
The proper interpretation of Mansfield's findings requires
an understanding of key differences between trade secrecy and
patent law. Only trade secrecy law (hand in hand with contract
law) can protect proprietary information from disclosure. On
the other hand, the full specification of a patented invention is
available to any pirate who can afford a computer and Internet
access to the world's public patent office databases. Locating a
research facility or a manufacturing plant in a developing coun-
try that inadequately protects patents, trademarks, and copy-
rights should not significantly increase the likelihood that pi-
racy will occur there. Under this logic, the respondents to
Mansfield's survey who expressed concerns over levels of"intel-
lectual property protection"39 in developing countries were most
likely articulating a fear that information disclosure might oc-
cur due to a lack of enforcement of trade secrecy law (or per-
haps from a desire by their marketing departments to suppress
competitors' sales). In other words, concerns over "intellectual
property" enforcement cannot logically be read to stand for the
proposition that strong patent, trademark, or copyright laws
affect foreign direct investment (as opposed to marketing deci-
sions).
Mansfield's paper itself offers support for this limited read-
ing. Mansfield includes many quoted comments from inter-
viewees indicating that disclosure concerns are paramount. As
(1996) (listing non-intellectual property factors critical to the decision to in-
vest in a developing country); Reichman & Lange, supra note 4, at 96 (noting
"the Daimler Benz decision to develop software in India, where the human re-
sources are comparably cheap but skillful").
38. Both American and European law reward foreign inventive activity
without regard to the state of the law where the invention was made. See, e.g.,
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b), (g) (2000).
39. E.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 13, app. I, at 24.
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one chemical executive explains: "Our concern still resides in
being able to procure a quick injunction against a confidant
who is in a position to disclose confidential information."' A
computer executive adds that "we have not implemented manu-
facturing operations there that use our highest level of technol-
ogy due to uncertainty over adequacy of trade secret protec-
tion."4' One firm's chief patent counsel complains that there are
"no effective means to prevent a Korean employee who develops
a knowledge of the equipment, from using that information in a
subsequent employment."42 Another patent counsel reveals that
"Itihe technology advantage that we enjoy over our competitors
often results from catalyst compositions and process know-
how... [which] need not be transferred to licensees or subsidi-
aries .... We typically minimize [our risk] by not disclosing
critical catalyst or process know-how information to the licen-
see."" These comments support the logical inference that dis-
closure fears-driven by inadequate trade secret or contract
law-affect decisions to invest in manufacturing facilities or to
transfer technology to the developing world. On the other
hand, there is little, if any, support in the comments for the
proposition that levels of patent, copyright, and trademark pro-
tection are relevant in foreign direct investment decisions.
A proper interpretation of Mansfield's results should also
be influenced by executives who expressed concern over how in-
tellectual property protection affects access to markets for their
goods, as opposed to factors related to where to make direct in-
vestments in facilities. The quoted comments indicate that the
desire to suppress piracy was primarily a marketing worry, as
opposed to an investment concern. A chief patent attorney rec-
40. Id. at 14.
41. Id. app. I, at 27.
42. Id. app. I, at 31.
43. Id. app. I, at 30.
44. A chemical executive states that "[our company] will not expose tech-
nology of any significant value in countries where it is not safe." Id. app. I, at
29. Other comments included expressions of concern by one executive over the
"theft of our technology" as opposed to infringement, id. app. I, at 24, and by
another over the need for "assurance... that technology will remain proprie-
tary," id. One director stated that "we are reluctant to do any straight transfer
of technology deals unless the information is coded or the technology is older
technology." Id. app. I, at 29. A chemical executive states that "you tend to use
your older technology ... [where pirates] have the capital and technical capa-
bility to duplicate your technology if they get their hands on it." Id. app. I, at
29-30. Another states, "The technology embodied in new, but copiable prod-
ucts like highly successful agrichemicals, are withheld." Id. app. I, at 30.
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ognized, "Inadequate or ineffective protection of intellectual
property works against introduction of the product into such [a]
country."45 A chemical executive commented that the level of in-
tellectual property protection determines "when a weak IP
country gets the product." 6 Another expressed the concern that
when drugs are "introduced to the market and the business [is]
built up to an interesting level... a patent pirate will come
into the market with an infringing product."47 Mansfield also
quotes a pharmaceutical executive concerned that "those devel-
oping countries that comprise major pharmaceutical markets,
such as Taiwan, India and Brazil, have not actually made any
significant improvements. 8 It is easy to understand why rights
holders care about levels of enforcement in the countries where
they market their products. This concern may have influenced
the attitudes of those surveyed on the very different question of
whether foreign direct investment decisions are influenced by
levels of intellectual property protection.
In addition, Mansfield did not restrict his survey to those
executives primarily in charge of making direct investment de-
cisions. In fact, at least two respondents are described as inter-
national marketing directors, while some are described as
CEOs or patent attorneys. 9 Given the comments included in
Mansfield's paper, disaggregating the concerns of a firm's mar-
keting division from the concerns of a firm's manufacturing and
R&D divisions seems to have been imperfectly accomplished, if
it was accomplished at all. This further taints Mansfield's cor-
relation between enforcement of intellectual property laws and
direct investment decisions. Finally, he is often unclear about
what the word "investment" means when used by the firm ex-
ecutives interviewed. 50 At times it refers loosely to the decision
to market a product as opposed to opening a manufacturing
plant or R&D facility. Mansfield's paper reveals no attempt to
define "direct investment" for the respondents, and some of the
overt marketing concerns expressed may be driven by the un-
derstanding that selling a product in a country, especially
45. Id. app. I, at 24.
46. Id. app. I, at 31.
47. Id. at 14. A chemical firm's managing counsel stated: "Prior to the new
Taiwan patent law, Taiwan manufacturers copied and exported our proprie-
tary agrichemicals." Id. at 13.
48. Id. at 13-14.
49. See id. app. I, at 25, 27, 39, 30, 31.
50. See id. app. I, at 23.
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through a wholly owned subsidiary, constitutes a sort of direct
investment.
All in all, a close look at Mansfield's research supports the
proposition that American firms with significant disclosure
worries are influenced by the level of enforcement of trade se-
crecy and contract law in making foreign direct investment de-
cisions. Its current status as dispositive evidence that maxi-
mum enforcement of all sorts of intellectual property law-and
especially patent law-will stimulate investment should not
remain unchallenged.
Instead of blindly relying on Mansfield's research, a more
rational strategy for developing countries would take into ac-
count the costs and benefits of protection in the context of their
unique economic situations.5 Depending on the category of in-
tellectual property subject to the TRIPS Agreement, this Arti-
cle suggests that developing countries should seriously consider
varying levels of compliance," not only as a cost reduction
measure, but also to create the sort of leverage needed to real-
ize diplomatic initiatives described in Part V. Under no circum-
stances should a developing country accept the confident asser-
tions made by some commentators that a maximalist protective
posture will stimulate foreign investment. A law-by-law analy-
sis is always warranted.
The research of those who question the link between strong
intellectual property protection and foreign direct investment
in the developing world provides support for a cautious ap-
proach.53 Professor Keith Maskus, a leading expert in the field,
has stated flatly that: "In theory, investment and licensing
flows do not necessarily increase with a strengthening of IPRs
[intellectual property rights]. " " Maskus notes that foreign di-
51. See Reichman & Lange, supra note 4, at 50 (stating that the "chronic
problem for policy makers even in the most developed countries is that the
one-size-fits-all paradigms... [are inadequate] in developing countries, where
different players at different stages of development demand different and con-
tradictory approaches").
52. See MASKUS, supra note 8, at 177 ("The least-developed countries
might opt for TRIPs-consistent minimal standards with wide limitations.");
Reichman & Lange, supra note 4, at 26 ('A minimalist approach to implement-
ing the TRIPS standards is fully consistent with the economic logic underlying
periodic rounds of multilateral trade negotiations within the ambit of the
GATT, and now, the WTO legal framework.").
53. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text; see also ENDESHAW, su-
pra note 37, at 104 ("The claim that the patent system encourages foreign in-
vestment in non-IC's has not been proved in practice.").
54. Maskus, supra note 34, at 145.
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rect investment in China increased ten-fold during a time of
virtually no effective enforcement of intellectual property
rights55 and suggests that lack of investment is usually due to
"low productivity, education, and skills."56 He finds that "strong
IPRs alone do not sufficiently generate strong incentives for
firms to invest in a country"7 and concludes that "[iif that were
the case, recent FDI [foreign direct investment] flows to devel-
oping economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa
and Eastern Europe ... [instead of] China, Brazil, and other
high-growth, large-market developing economies with weak
IPRs."58
Carlos A. Prima Braga and Carsten Fink of the World
Bank are similarly skeptical of exaggerated claims about the
benefits of strong protection of intellectual property, stating
that "the available empirical evidence does not conclusively es-
tablish the relationship between IPRs and FDI decisions."59 Al-
though they admit that the most sophisticated of the develop-
ing nations may see local innovation increase as protection for
intellectual property rights is strengthened, they emphasize
that:
[I]f the country has greater production capabilities (a proxy for its ca-
pacity to imitate), but limited innovative capacity (as measured by its
R&D basis, for example), higher standards of protection will likely
displace local producers, raise prices, and transfer rent from local
consumers and producers to foreign title-holders, resulting in a nega-
tive welfare impact.60
They also note, again depending on the unique circum-
stances of the developing country, that:
[T]here are two effects that could justify the inference that IPRs have
a negative influence on foreign investment. First, stronger IPR pro-
55. Id. at 115, 119.
56. Id. at 124.
57. Id. at 128.
58. Id. at 128-29; see also Correa, supra note 5, at 86 (stating that foreign
direct investment "increased substantially in Brazil from 1970 until the debt
crisis exploded in 1985, while in Thailand [foreign direct investment] boomed
during the eighties," a period that saw little protection there for intellectual
property rights (citing U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEV.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT at 4,
U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/24, U.N. Sales No. E.93.II.A.10 (1993))).
59. Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between
Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 163, 164 (1998); see also ENDESHAW, supra note 37, at 104 (stating
that patent protection is not a key factor in determining the likelihood of for-
eign direct investment in any given country).
60. Braga & Fink, supra note 59, at 167.
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tection provides title holders with increased market power and could,
at least theoretically, cause firms to actually divest and reduce their
service to foreign countries. Second, higher levels of protection may
cause TNCs [transnational corporations] to switch their preferred
mode of delivery from foreign production to licensing.6'
Similar skepticism is expressed by Carlos Correa after survey-
ing the existing empirical research. 2
As mentioned earlier, however, the marketing department
of a multinational corporation may be quite interested in the
level of protection a developing country affords intellectual
property, especially trademarks and patents. Levi Strauss, for
example, cannot compete effectively in a market filled with
cheap knockoffs. If trademark law is vigorously enforced in a
developing country, foreign jean manufacturers will have an in-
creased incentive to import their goods. Maskus concludes gen-
erally that as developing countries "strengthen their IPR re-
gimes they should attract rising import volumes"63 and in
particular countries with significant imitative capacity "should
absorb higher import volumes"6 4 when they strengthen their
patent regimes. Complying with TRIPS may increase the flow
of goods into a new member of the WTO; whether to encourage
or discourage that flow is a policy decision for each particular
country to make.
It is worth noting, however, that there may be an indirect
link between a country opening its market to outside rights
holders and attracting foreign direct investment. One of Mans-
field's respondents noted:
Inadequate or ineffective protection of intellectual property works
against introduction of the product into such country, whereby the
business can never grow sufficiently to even reach questions of direct
investment or licensing to subsidiaries. Thus, inadequate or ineffec-
tive protection of intellectual property in a country weighs heavily
against.., the natural progression of events which could lead to the
question of foreign investment.65
61. Id. at 172.
62. See CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLEMENTING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
GENERAL CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 28-29
(1998) (noting research in support of the position that developing countries
will not gain, and may suffer, from the strengthening of intellectual property
rights).
63. MASKUS, supra note 8, at 118; see also id. at 117 (showing a table
simulating "increases in total imports by sector into developing countries re-
sulting from strengthened patents laws").
64. Id. at 117.
65. See MANSFIELD, supra note 13, app. I, at 24.
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This statement echoes the size-of-markets hypothesis that
assumes "foreign investment will take place as soon as the
market is large enough to permit the capturing of economies of
scale."66 If Maskus is correct that strengthening intellectual
property law will increase import volumes,67 then a developing
country with an adequate number of consumers may eventually
see some direct investment following the successful exploitation
of product markets. Whether this is the most efficient way to
attract investment is another question entirely.
This Article need not determine the precise extent to which
strengthening intellectual property laws provides incentives for
investment and creativity in developing economies. Empirical
research is lacking that takes into account both the different
types of economies presented by the developing world (China
and Mali, for example, present two very different cases) and the
different categories of intellectual property laws protected by
the TRIPS Agreement. Trademark protection for brand names,
patent protection for biotechnology, copyright protection for
computer software, and trade secrecy for chemical processes all
raise distinct issues. Evidence is also lacking on the economic
cost of closing down firms in developing countries that make
unprotected or counterfeit goods. 68 The evidence does suggest,
however, that a developing country should not simply accept
the maximalist claim of "the more intellectual property protec-
tion, the better."
II. RATIONAL LEGISLATIVE AGENDAS
Rational, self-interested policy makers in the developing
world must take a hard look at each potential legal option in
the context of their own economies in order to choose how best
to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. Choices should be made
in light of local conditions and the categories of rights sought to
be regulated: trade secrets, patents, copyrights, trademarks,
plant varieties, or other types of intellectual property.
66. Anthony E. Scaperlanda & Laurence J. Maurer, The Determinants of
U.S. Direct Investment in the E.E.C., 59 AM. ECON. REV. 558, 560 (1969).
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. See MASKUS, supra note 8, at 157-59 (suggesting one-half of one per-
cent of the Lebanese workforce would lose their jobs).
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A. RATIONAL MAXIMUM COMPLIANCE:
Low-COST/HIGH-YIELD LEGISLATION
Although Part I suggests that a minimalist approach may
often be appropriate, especially as regards to patent law, it is
helpful to begin by discussing the areas where strict enforce-
ment of rights may be welfare enhancing. Not surprisingly, this
category primarily includes protection for sub-patentable sub-
ject matter where the welfare costs of protection are lowest and
innovation by firms in nonindustrialized countries is most
likely.
1. Trade Secrets
Enacting strong trade secret laws has several advantages
for developing countries. As noted above, firm managers are
likely to take into account the levels of trade secret protection
in making decisions about where to locate research and manu-
facturing facilities.69 MegaCorp should care very deeply about
legal protection for its trade secrets because once a secret is re-
vealed to the public, it is no longer protected and may be used
freely by MegaCorp's competitors anywhere.0 If Thailand offers
effective enforcement of trade secret laws and Taiwan does not,
then MegaCorp should rationally prefer to minimize its risk
and locate a new facility in Thailand. In addition, protection of
trade secrets can help "undergird an efficient system of con-
tracts to promote formal technology transfer through licens-
69. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text; MASKUS, supra note 8,
at 110 (suggesting a firm may eschew local production in favor of importing
goods where it finds "limited trade secrets protection in the import market,
where licensing could risk unauthorized loss of proprietary information");
Sherwood, supra note 10, at 502 ("[Mlost kinds of technology will not be will-
ingly provided by their originators either through sale or license if their re-
lease into a non-protective environment places them at risk of loss to competi-
tors."); see also Summary of Remarks of Robert Sherwood, in Intellectual
Property Rights and Economic Development: An Agenda for The World Bank-
ing Group, at www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/technet/sem-sums/march5.htm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2003) ("Companies are reluctant to train their employees
to higher levels of technology if there is risk they will be hired away by com-
petitors to gain that technology.").
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (stat-
ing that to qualify for protection, information must be "sufficiently valuable
and secret to afford an actual or potential advantage over others"); see also
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39 (stating that members need only pro-
tect information that "is secret in the sense that it is not. .. generally known
among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal
with the kind of information in question").
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ing."7' Effective enforcement of contracts can "make it more cer-
tain that the licensee will not misappropriate the technology
or... that technical employees will not defect to form compet-
ing firms."72 Maskus suggests that for foreign direct invest-
ment, "there could be both an expansion effect as the costs of
transferring and protecting know-how within the firm are re-
duced, and a substitution effect as [multinational enterprises]
shift away from FDI toward external licensing... [with] the
expansion effect strongly dominat[ing] in developing econo-
mies. 73
In addition to assuaging the fears of foreign investors, de-
veloping countries may find other reasons to provide strong
protection for trade secrets.7' First, the administrative costs are
low. The TRIPS Agreement does not require the establishment
of a special office in which to register confidential information.
It merely mandates that trade secret owners have a cause of
action against someone who acquires a valuable secret "in a
manner contrary to honest commercial practice."75 In the
United States, this typically requires proof of a physical tres-
pass to the owner's premises or a breach of confidentiality on
the part of someone who knows the secret.6 Second, since the
cause of action is only for misappropriation, the successful
claimant is not granted exclusive rights to the confidential in-
formation.77 Significant monopoly costs are not imposed on the
public.7 ' Third, protecting trade secrets fosters sub-patentable
innovation.9 In developing countries, where sophisticated re-
71. MASKUS, supra note 8, at 142.
72. Id. at 138.
73. Id.
74. See Reichman, supra note 21, at 59-62 (discussing advantages of
trade secrecy protection for developing countries).
75. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39(2).
76. See Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropria-
tion of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and
After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doc-
trines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 858-62 (1998).
77. In the United States, at least, it is clear that reverse engineering and
independent creation are legitimate methods to discover trade secrets. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995). In addition, the
trade secret owner must take reasonable precautions to ensure secrecy to keep
its rights. Id. § 40(b)(4).
78. See Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics
of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 979-80 (1991); cf Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) ("Trade secret law promotes the shar-
ing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of industry . .
79. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-93.
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search and development is seldom conducted, fostering sub-
patentable innovation may be an efficient first step in stimulat-
ing local creativity." Fourth, a key section of the TRIPS
Agreement requires the trade secret owner to take reasonable
steps to keep its confidential information secret.8 In other
words, the most significant cost of enforcement-fencing off the
information-is borne privately and, in the case of outside in-
vestors, by the foreign firm.
Finally, vigorous and enthusiastic enforcement of trade se-
cret law is a cheap way for a developing country to signal to
outsiders that it takes its obligations under the TRIPS Agree-
ment seriously. Some may doubt the effectiveness of the signal-
ing function of intellectual property law reform, "but there is a
widespread and growing belief in its importance in emerging
economies."" In short, there seems little downside to the en-
thusiastic enforcement of the trade secret article of the TRIPS
Agreement, irrespective of a country's level of economic devel-
opment. Truly effective enforcement, however, entails not only
the legislature's creation of a cause of action for misappropria-
tion, but also the establishment of a judiciary competent to ef-
fectively administer the law. Unfortunately, in developing na-
tions, a weak judiciary is a common problem.83 For this reason,
legislative language should be drafted at a higher level of speci-
ficity and detail in order to make the enforcement task easier.
For example, legislation should clearly state that reverse engi-
neering is permissible and that covenants not to reveal tech-
nology are enforceable by injunction. In the context of copyright
law, Dennis Karjala has advised, "[c]onsideration should be
given in the developing countries to the drafting of specific
limitations on the scope of copyright protection .... This would
give more assurance that courts in those lands will not make
the same mistakes found in many early United States deci-
,,84
sions.
80. See Reichman, supra note 21, at 58-74 (suggesting developing coun-
tries should consider protection for trade secrets and sub-patentable utility
models); see also MASKUS, supra note 8, at 143 (discussing initial Japanese
efforts of adopting an inclusive patent system).
81. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39(2)(c).
82. Maskus, supra note 34, at 137-38.
83. See Sherwood, supra note 10, at 537-38.
84. Dennis Karjala, Theoretical Foundations for the Protection of Com-




2. Sui Generis Protection of Local Special Innovations
Developing countries might learn from Congress's willing-
ness to target certain local industries for special protective leg-
islation. For example, Congress recently granted patentlike
protection for boat hulls85 and biotech processes" without the
requirement that applicants prove nonobviousness in light of
the prior art.87 Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement prevents other
countries from similarly favoring local creators of sub-
patentable innovation by protecting their work. Although a de-
veloping country is unlikely to have numerous strong sectors in
its economy, it may have some modest innovators worthy of
special protection from competition. For example, if a country
has a strong textile industry that occasionally improves its dye-
ing and weaving techniques, protection of new (but obvious)
methods should tend to favor local firms, even if protection is
not discriminatory on its face.88 Professor Reichman discusses
at length the possible stimulus to local innovation that sui
generis or utility model protection might provide. 9 Evidence
from Japanese history also suggests the wisdom of protecting
sub-patentable utility models as an economy begins to indus-
trialize. 90 In the short-term, however, direct local benefits may
be limited to situations where the competitive edge provided to
a local firm generally disadvantages foreign firms and the costs
of licensing innovations are not borne entirely by local consum-
ers. A careful analysis of local conditions is necessary to deter-
mine when protecting special categories of sub-patentable in-
novation makes economic sense.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 103(b)(1) (2000). Section 103 is often the most significant
hurdle for inventors wishing to earn a patent. Now, boat hull designers and
biotech process engineers need only prove that their creations are new and
useful.
87. See generally Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint
on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119 (discussing the constitutionality of
these statutes).
88. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4 (stating that WTO mem-
bers must treat foreign nationals equally).
89. Reichman, supra note 21, at 62-74.
90. See MASKUS, supra note 8, at 148 (citing Keith E. Maskus & Christine
McDaniel, Impacts of the Japanese Patent System on Productivity Growth, 11
JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 557 (1999)).
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3. Traditional Knowledge About Plant Genetic Resources
A more promising area for sui generis protection (espe-
cially after the 2001 WTO ministerial meeting in Doha)91 might
encompass traditional knowledge about plant genetic resources
maintained by long-term occupant communities (LTOC)92 in
developing countries. Voluminous literature discusses the pros
and cons of protecting traditional knowledge from a global wel-
fare perspective.93 Although in other articles I have argued that
LTOC have little hope of obtaining special rights,94 there seems
no doubt that a sovereign state can fashion a valuable bargain-
ing chip by proprietizing specialized local knowledge about the
identity and uses of various plant genetic resources."
Many LTOC, especially in South and Central America,
have developed and maintained valuable knowledge about the
uses of the plants in their environment. 96 Countless current
91. In November 2001, the WTO instructed the TRIPS Council to examine
"the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and
other relevant new developments raised by Members pursuant to Article 71.1."
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1
(Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.wto.orgtenglish/thewtoe/ministe/min0le/
mindecle.pdf.
92. Rather than using the term "indigenous peoples," I adopt the term
"long-term occupant communities" from Gregory F. Maggio, Recognizing the
Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for
Conserving Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 179, 181 (1998).
Although the phrase is awkward, it avoids the problem of establishing racial
or cultural tests to determine which groups might qualify for protection. It
also makes inhabitants of rain forests and other bio-rich areas of the world
sound less like exotic "others."
93. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASPECTS OF ETHNOBIOLOGY (Mi-
chael Blakeney ed., 1999); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (Tom Greaves ed., 1994).
94. See Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 519 (2003).
95. See Ivor D. Mogoll6n-Rojas, The Preservation of Local Biodiversity In-
heritance and Indigenous People's Knowledge Proprietorship in the Venezuelan
and Andean Community Legislation, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 535 (2002)
(detailing Andean pact legislation vesting rights to certain genetic resources in
the nation where it is found); J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of
Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 441, 466 (2000) (discussing preserving and managing "biogenetic
endowments" as part of a rational strategy for developing countries).
96. See Curtis Horton, Protecting Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity Un-
der Intellectual Property Law: Toward a New International System, 10 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 3-8 (1995). The research of a pharmaceutical firm into
the medicinal value of plants valued by indigenous groups found:
Although screened for only a few characteristics, over 50 percent of
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pharmaceutidals have been developed from plant products that
originate in developing countries. 97 Without the research leads
provided by those who maintain traditional knowledge about
the uses of plants, the bioprospecting that leads to drug devel-
opment would be much less profitable.98 With a few notable ex-
ceptions, 9 this knowledge is currently exploited without com-
pensation by large multinational pharmaceutical, agribusiness,
and biotech firms.' A rational legislature should consider
shaping its intellectual property statutes to capture some of the
value of the plant genetic resources within the country's bor-
ders.01
the plants showed some pharmacological use, or "activity." Seventy-
four percent of the pharmacologically active plants correlated with
the activity reported by the indigenous groups. By contrast, random
plant screenings average only 8-15 percent of samples showing some
activity. Other examples show a similar three to eight-fold increase in
the efficiency of initial testing of plants for drug activity when indige-
nous medicinal plant knowledge is used.
Assuming a six-fold increase in screening efficiency, and using
other industry assumptions, the probability of developing at least one
marketable pharmaceutical from 1,000 samples grows from 22 per-
cent to 78 percent, or three and a half times. This makes it that much
more likely that using indigenous peoples' knowledge will allow a
"lucky" pharmaceutical manufacturer to find a drug which might earn
huge revenues.
Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
97. See Stephen B. Brush, Whose Knowledge, Whose Genes, Whose
Rights?, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 9 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stab-
insky eds., 1996).
98. See Gordon C. Rausser & Arthur A. Small, Valuing Research Leads:
Bioprospecting and the Conservation of Genetic Resources, 108 J. POL. ECON.
173, 195 (2000).
99. Merck has a formal agreement with the government of Costa Rica.
Elizabeth Longacre, Note, Advancing Science While Protecting Developing
Countries from Exploitation of Their Resources and Knowledge, 13 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 963, 996 (2003); see also Charles R.
McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge
Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INTL & COMP. L.
547, 570-73 (2003) (describing arrangements between pharmaceutical inter-
ests and the Aguarana people of Peru).
100. See generally VANDANA SHIVA, MONOCULTURES OF THE MIND:
PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSITY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (1993).
101. See Mogoll6n-Rojas, supra note 95, at 537-43 (describing recent legis-
lation). Patent law is not helpful in most situations because traditional knowl-
edge will usually flunk the novelty requirement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 1, art. 27(1). Although some traditional knowledge looks like a trade se-
cret, questions about ownership and the right of an individual to divulge com-
munal knowledge have so far prevented trade secrecy from serving as a tool to
protect against the revelation of valuable information. The difficulties with
ownership are often insurmountable. Knowledge is often widely distributed
between different groups, and it is likely that an individual, who will probably
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One way for a developing country to capture value may be
to pass legislation vesting rights to traditional knowledge in a
national registry empowered to demand a license when that
knowledge is appropriated (either from the registry or from its
original source). 10 2 In Ecuador, Foundation EcoCiencia, a Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO), is pioneering an experi-
mental project to create a database with entries provided by six
different indigenous groups. °3 Professor Peter Drahos has
trumpeted the merits of formally registering traditional knowl-
edge for the purposes of more efficient licensing.!" Identifying
individuals who fail to pay a licensing fee may be problematic,
but targeting the largest multinational pharmaceutical, agri-
business, and biotech firms for the purpose of negotiating blan-
ket access to knowledge in the registry would not be. Other ap-
proaches are certainly possible, but the creation of some sort of
sui generis right in traditional knowledge would generate prop-
erty that could be sold, licensed, or otherwise used as a bar-
gaining chip with foreign firms or governments. It might also
provide incentives for the continued maintenance of the knowl-
edge and the environment that produced and sustained it. 105
4. Local Land Races
Similarly, developing countries may profit from creating
special rights in valuable plant genetic resources developed and
maintained by local farmers over multiple generations. The
wide variety of local land races maintained in developing coun-
tries constitutes a bank of genetic resources that multinational
agribusiness firms frequently exploit to strengthen and im-
prove their products.0 6 For example, farmers in just two small
not be subject to an enforceable duty not to disclose, will freely reveal the in-
formation, thereby destroying the secret. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-43 (1995). A sui generis initiative would probably
be necessary to protect traditional knowledge.
102. See Peter Drahos, Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and
Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-Collecting Society the Answer?, 22 EUROPEAN
INTELL. PROP. REV. 245, 248-50 (2000).
103. See JOSEPH HENRY VOGEL ET AL., THE BIODIVERSITY CARTEL:
TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE INTO TRADE SECRETS (Joseph
Henry Vogel ed., 2000).
104. Drahos, supra note 102, at 248-50 (discussing the benefits of a global
database).
105. See VIRGINIA D. NAZAREA, CULTURAL MEMORY AND BIODIVERSITY 73-
89 (1998) (detailing how knowledge is lost when long-term occupant communi-
ties begin to unravel).
106. See Brush, supra note 97.
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areas of the Philippines cultivate almost fifty varieties of sweet
potatoes, all of which have distinctive characteristics. 10 7 Estab-
lishing a sui generis right would offer some of the same advan-
tages as recognizing rights in traditional knowledge and with
fewer practical difficulties.
First, collecting and registering plant genetic resources is
easier than documenting an intangible like traditional knowl-
edge. Second, enforcement would be somewhat easier, given
that a plant's origin can be traced through the analysis of its
DNA. Of course, a widespread requirement that patent applica-
tions reveal the origin of plant genetic resources used to make
the claimed invention would also make identifying users easier.
While an official registry and central licensing program are not
the only ways to proprietize local plant genetic resources, de-
veloping countries would be well advised to find some way to
profit from their resources. Most of the diversity of the world's
germ plasm resides in the developing world. Just as industrial-
ized nations have changed their laws to capture the value of
technological resources, developing countries should adapt
their legal systems to harness the vast riches of their plant ge-
netic resources.
B. RATIONAL MINIMAL COMPLIANCE: LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
The Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement recognizes "the
special needs of the least-developed country Members in re-
spect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of
laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound
and viable technological base."0 8 Legislatures in developing
countries should be encouraged to take advantage of this flexi-
bility when adapting their laws to comply with TRIPS, espe-
cially when it is possible to capture the benefits of outside in-
novation.
1. Patent Law
Although each country must take a realistic look at its own
economy and markets, developing countries will often have at
least two reasons to prefer minimum compliance within the
TRIPS patent framework. First, reducing the number of pat-
ents should reduce costs to local manufacturers and local con-
sumers of their goods. Second, minimal compliance creates
107. See NAZAREA, supra note 105, at 45.
108. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.
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more opportunities to leverage the sort of advantageous pub-
lic/private partnerships described in Part V. In general, a de-
veloping country should consider selecting compliance options
that tend to discourage patent applications by foreign firms in
order to reap some of the rewards of outside innovation while
bearing as little of the cost as possible. The Preamble to the.- 109 dth meiso
TRIPS Agreement suggests this option, and the merits of
flexibility are trumpeted by the WTO itself."' Those with moral
qualms about free riding can be pointed to the well-documented
role that piracy has played in the history of the economic devel-
opment of the countries currently demanding the highest de-
gree of protection.'
a. Patent Novelty Rules
The TRIPS Agreement requires that members of the WTO
shall make patents "available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of in-
dustrial application,""2 but nowhere does the Agreement set
forth a definition of "new.""3 Currently, member states employ
very different novelty rules."' In the United States, for exam-
ple, during the year prior to applying for a patent, the inventor
is permitted to make a commercial use of the invention or pub-
lish an article describing it without compromising its pat-
109. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(1) ("Members may, in for-
mulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary
to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological develop-
ment, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.").
110. See Mike Moore, Moore: Countries Must Feel Secure That They
Can Use TRIPS Flexibility (June 20, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/news0l-e/dg-tripsmedicines_010620_e.htm.
111. See, e.g., Drahos, supra note 2, at 768 (noting history of chemical pi-
racy in the United Kingdom and failure to protect pharmaceuticals and bio-
logical processes in other developed countries); see also VANDANA SHIVA,
BIoPIRAcY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1997) (criticizing
Western appropriation of plant genetic resources in developing countries).
112. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (emphasis added).
113. See Reichman, supra note 21, at 30 (observing that "there is no agreed
international standard of absolute novelty, and, within limits, the developing
countries may pick and choose from among the different approaches recog-
nized in the domestic patent laws").
114. See HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION 78-82, 88-97
(1993) (comparing novelty requirements of various jurisdictions).
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entability."' The same prefiling disclosure will cause a failure
of novelty and bar to patentability in Europe.'16 The flexibility
in defining what is a "new" invention, combined with the terri-
torial nature of patent law, creates opportunities to allow le-
gitimate access to many inventions.
First, legislatures in developing countries must remember
that to obtain protection for an invention in a specific country,
a patent owner must prosecute its patent in that country's pat-
ent office." 7 There is no world patent office where an inventor
can obtain worldwide rights. In other words, a researcher or
manufacturer in Malaysia, Colombia, or Fiji can legally use an
invention that is patented only in the United States or Europe.
TRIPS does not alter this fact. For simplicity's sake, imagine a
nation that opens its patent office and joins the WTO the same
day. Because of the territorial nature of patent law, it would
have no immediate obligation to recognize patents already
granted by any other member states. The state could accurately
describe itself as "the cheapest place in the world to conduct re-
search and development, a legally license-free environment in
which to use any invention made prior to today.""8 Of course,
the attractiveness of this claim depends on the strength of the
local economic infrastructure (workforce, communications, fa-
cilities, etc.), but the efficacy of such a strategy has some sup-
port in fact."' The question arises, of course, whether a new
WTO member has any obligation under the TRIPS Agreement
to entertain applications from inventors whose patents have is-
sued elsewhere or who have patent applications pending in for-
eign patent offices.
If an emerging state adopts, for example, the E.U. defini-
tion of "new," its obligation to consider applications for existing
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2000).
116. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art.
54, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter European Patent Convention].
117. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 27-34.
118. The attractiveness of the claim would diminish over time as patents
on new inventions issued.
119. See Correa, supra note 5, at 86 (noting that "FDI in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry outpaced FDI in most other sectors in Brazil after patent protec-
tion for medicines was abolished in that country.... [And in Turkey] FDI in
[the pharmaceutical] sector was the largest among all other manufacturing
industries with foreign participation [after it] ... eliminated pharmaceutical
protection in 1961"). An absence of protection may be less attractive to foreign
manufacturers, as opposed to foreign researchers, because rules against im-
porting unlicensed patented goods might make most important markets inac-
cessible.
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inventions would seem to be minimal. 12 According to Article 54
of the European Patent Convention, "[an invention shall be
considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the
art."121 The state of the art is defined "to comprise everything
made available to the public by means of a written or oral de-
scription, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of
the [application]." 22 From the perspective of a new member of
the WTO, every patent previously issued abroad has been
"made available to the public"; therefore, a new member that
adopts the E.U. position on novelty would have no obligation to
consider applications claiming an invention patented else-
where. Neither would it seem to have any obligation to consider
inventions described in pending patent applications that have
been made public (as in most jurisdictions) 123 or inventions used
publicly or described in a printed publication.2 4
Some commentators have claimed, therefore, that the
TRIPS Agreement requires absolutely no protection for existing
patents or patent applications. 25 A strong argument can be of-
fered, however, that a new member must consider at least one
category of application for inventions created before adherence
to the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement requires that
members comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris Con-
vention for the Protection of Industrial Property.1 26 Article 4 of
the Paris Convention sets forth the following rule governing the
effect of a prior patent application in a foreign jurisdiction:
[Any subsequent filing in any of the other countries of the Union be-
120. See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 93 (2001) (recommending a standard that re-
quires "absolute novelty").
121. European Patent Convention, supra note 116, art. 54(1).
122. Id. art. 54(2).
123. The United States is one of the few jurisdictions that provides any se-
crecy for patent applications. For the first eighteen months of prosecution the
patent application is kept secret. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
124. See, e.g., id. § 102(a)-(b).
125. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS 365 (2d ed. 2003) ("'[Plipe-line protection' was not included in
TRIPS."); Sherwood, supra note 10, at 498-99 (noting that "[b]ecause the
TRIPS Agreement does not contain a 'pipeline' provision, only inventions made
after the law changes will be eligible for patent protection").
126. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1). The Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property was drafted in 1883 and was until
1995 the major international treaty dealing with patents, trademarks, and un-
fair competition. Its lack of strong minimal substantive standards, enforce-




fore the expiration of the periods referred to above [twelve months] 127
shall not be invalidated by reason of any acts accomplished in the in-
terval, in particular, another filing, the publication or exploitation of
the invention, the putting on sale of copies of the design... and such
acts cannot give rise to any third-party right .... "'
It is doubtful, therefore, that a member of the WTO could bend
its novelty rules to exclude from patentability an invention
when (1) a valid application had been filed in the prior twelve
months in the patent office of a member of the Paris Conven-
tion,129 and (2) no public use or publication of the invention was
made prior to that filing.
To summarize, a new member of the WTO could legiti-
mately choose to give those within its borders, both citizens and
foreign firms, free access to a multitude of inventions irrespec-
tive of whether they were patented elsewhere. Even a mature
state with an existing patent system could grant free access to
a wide variety of the world's inventions existing at the time of
its adherence to TRIPS (except patents previously issued by its
own patent office still enforceable under local law and those
embodied in the one-year pipeline discussed above). 3 ° At a
minimum, all developing states should consider adopting the
European rather than American approach to determining nov-
elty.' The absence of novelty rules in the TRIPS Agreement
provides remarkable flexibility to developing countries. Part IV
explores the leverage this gives and examines some of the prob-
lems of staking out a bold position.
b. Patentability of Natural Isolates and Life Forms
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement allows member states
to decline to patent plants and animals (other than micro-
127. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar.
20, 1883, art. 4(C)(1), 21 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
128. Id. art. 4(B).
129. Most members of the WTO are members of the Paris Convention.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 36-38, 262-64 (2000).
130. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 65(5) (developing countries may
not diminish protection provided by them at the time the Agreement enters
into force).
131. See Reichman, supra note 21, at 30 (explaining that "[i]n principle,
developing countries may allow oral prior art to defeat novelty," and that it
might also be in the best interest of developing countries not "to provide any
novelty grace period (in keeping with the current majority rule) because this
tends to enlarge the field of inventions patented in developed countries that
will remain available for local exploitation without payment of royalties").
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organisms).' 32 Other important categories of products may also
be excludable because the TRIPS Agreement does not include a
definition of the key term "invention." This omission may per-
mit a patent office to deny patents for gene sequences or natu-
ral isolates from animal or plant tissue. Although it is settled in
the United States (where the term "invention" is defined to in-
clude "discovery")133 that gene sequences and naturally occur-
ring isolates may be patented, 34 the rest of the world is far
from full agreement.135 The U.S. Patent Office may accept that
human DNA or purified adrenaline136 or an extract from rosy
periwinkle' 37 is an "invention," but the common understanding
of the term hardly compels the conclusion.'3 3 The TRIPS
Agreement does not expressly require the counterintuitive (al-
though economically plausible) definition of "invention" to in-
clude products of nature.139 As with "novelty," defining "inven-
tion" creates opportunities for a developing country to lower the
cost of conducting certain kinds of scientific research within its
borders by reducing licensing costs. 140 Excluding gene se-
132. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(3)(b); see infra notes 167-75
and accompanying text (discussing sui generis protection for plant varieties).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2000) ("The term 'invention' means invention or
discovery.").
134. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 150 (2d ed. 2000) (citing S.M. Thomas et al., Ownership
of the Human Genome, 380 NATURE 387, 387 (Apr. 4, 1996) (documenting 1175
patents issued on human DNA sequences)).
135. See WATAL, supra note 120, at 163-70.
136. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 97-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1911) (Hand, J.) (upholding patent validity in purified adrenaline), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 196 F. 496, 497 (2d Cir. 1912) (affirming on the issue of
patent validity).
137. See Srividhya Ragavan, The Global South as the Key to Biodiversity
and Biotechnology-A Reply to Professor Chen, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,358,
10,360 n.16 (2002) (discussing patent on anticancer drugs derived from the
rosy periwinkle plant found in Madagascar).
138. See WATAL, supra note 120, at 133.
139. It would not necessarily be a contradiction for a developing country to
deny patent protection to DNA and still recognize sui generis rights in local
land races. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. If the denial of
patentability of DNA is based on lack of inventorship, one could argue for ex-
ceptional treatment when DNA has a true inventor. Two sorts of DNA might
qualify: (1) DNA that does not occur in nature, for example, scientifically
modified DNA; and (2) DNA whose characteristics are due to generations of
selective breeding and cultivation, as in the sort of land races discussed above.
See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
140. Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement also allows WTO members to ex-
clude inventions from patentability on the grounds of protecting "ordre public
or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to
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quences and other natural isolates from protection would en-
able a developing country to reduce the cost of jump-starting a
biotech industry.
c. Prior User's Rights
The doctrine of prior user's rights also lowers licensing
costs. For example, to ameliorate the harsh effect of a patent
priority rule that rewards the first to apply for a patent rather
than the first to invent, legislation in European nations pro-
tects inventors, researchers, and manufacturers who lose the
race to the patent office.14 ' The doctrine authorizes a party
other than the patentee to continue to practice an invention as
he or she did at the time the patentee's application was filed. 4 1
For example, firm A develops a new, useful, and nonobvious
process for dyeing carpet fibers, but, while firm A debates
whether to keep the process secret or apply for a patent, firm B
files for a patent claiming the same process. If firm B's patent
issues, the doctrine of prior user's rights will permit firm A to
continue using the process in the same manner as it did at the
time of firm B's application. 143 A developing country that pro-
tects the rights of prior users insulates its industry from the
negative effects of a patent issued to a foreign firm that covers
technology currently in local use. In general, rules that favor
users at the expense of innovators should benefit developing
countries where local industries do not yet have the capacity to
engage in significant inventive activity.
avoid serious prejudice to the environment." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1,
art. 27(2). The language of the clause, however, states that this exclusion may
only be invoked to prevent "commercial exploitation" of the offending inven-
tion, id., and therefore, Article 27 may not be available as a means to make an
invention available for license-free use.
141. See, e.g., Deutsche Patentgesetz [German Patent Act], § 12(1) ("A pat-
ent shall have no effect against any person who, at the time of the filing of the
application, had already used the invention in this country, or had made the
necessary arrangements for so doing."), reprinted in FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER
ET AL., GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAWS, at
I/B/i, IIB/6 (3d ed. 1996).
142. See id.
143. The same result would be achieved in the United States if the Patent
Office found that a prior public use of an invention by firm A caused firm B's
application to fail for want of novelty. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (providing
no entitlement to a patent if "the invention was known or used by others in
this country").
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d. Disclosure Requirements
Several other statutory options are available to a develop-
ing country that wants legitimately to discourage foreign pat-
ent applications. For example, a developing country may want
to accept an invitation expressly offered by the TRIPS Agree-
ment to require that a patentee reveal the "best mode" for prac-
ticing the invention.14 Although WTO members must require
that an inventor disclose the invention in a manner clear
enough to enable someone skilled in the art to practice it,145 the
additional requirement of describing the "best mode" of practice
is less common. To see the advantages of the best mode re-
quirement, imagine a chemical patent for an industrial solvent
that specifies "one unit each from the list of agents contained in
schedule A [fifteen related chemicals], one from the list in
schedule B [twenty related chemicals], and one from schedule C
[twelve related chemicals) be mixed together at a temperature
above 100 degrees centigrade, but below 151 degrees." In order
to mix each combination at each degree centigrade between 100
and 151, one would have to make over 180,000 trials (15 x 20 x
12 x 50 = 180,000). As long as most of the 180,000 combinations
produce the solvent, then the patent will be adequately en-
abled.'46 However, if a handful of the combinations work signifi-
cantly better than the rest, the firm may try to keep those com-
binations secret and will think twice about prosecuting the
patent in a best-mode jurisdiction. In addition, failure of the
144. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 29(1) ("Members... may re-
quire the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention
known to the inventor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the
priority date of the application."); see also Reichman, supra note 21, at 33 (ad-
vocating the adoption of the best mode requirement).
145. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and us-
ing it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same ... ");
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 29(1) ("Members shall require that an
applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently
clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the
art .... ).
146. For an extreme example, see Ex Parte Chen, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1025, 1028
(Patent & Trademark Office Bd. of Patent Appeals & Interferences, June 30,
2000), which held that a patent was adequately enabled even though 99% of
the combinations provided failed to produce the described result. Given the
state of the art, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences reasoned that
the low success rate did not require "undue experimentation." Id.
147. To a certain extent, developing countries can piggyback on the best-
mode requirement of the United States, except as to firms willing to forego
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patentee to reveal the "best mode" can provide a defense for
some users accused of infringement.
In addition to requiring disclosure of the best mode of prac-
ticing the invention, developing countries should consider plac-
ing some additional disclosure obligations on patentees.'48 Sev-
eral commentators have suggested that patentees should be
required to disclose the origin of plant genetic resources used to
make an invention. 49 Nuno Pires de Carvalho notes that "what
is at stake is the possibility of detecting commercial gains from
the use of genetic resources, so that countries supplying those
resources can demand their share in the benefits."5 ' Signato-
ries to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) agree that
"[a]ccess to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed
consent of the Contracting Party providing such re-
sources" 15' with the express goal of "sharing [with the donor
state] in a fair and equitable way the results of research and
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and
other utilization of genetic resources."52 One method of policing
obligations under the Convention would be to mandate disclo-
sure of the sources of plant genetic resources in patent applica-
tions.
Although a member of the WTO may not require disclosure
as a condition of patentability,13 a requirement accompanied by
substantial fines or other penalties unrelated to patent en-
forceability would not violate the express terms of the TRIPS
Agreement and would allow signatories of the CBD to monitor
their obligations. To the extent developing countries are the re-
positories of significant genetic resources, a disclosure require-
ment may make "equitable sharing" more likely and, more im-
portantly for the purposes of this Article, may deter patent
U.S. patent protection in order to protect its trade secrets.
148. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 62(1) (authorizing mem-
bers to "require, as a condition of the acquisition or maintenance of the
intellectual property rights... compliance with reasonable procedures and
formalities").
149. See Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Ge-
netic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without
Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 371, 372 (2000).
150. Id.
151. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 15(5), 1760
U.N.T.S. 79, 152, 31 I.L.M. 818, 828.
152. Id. art. 15(7).
153. See Carvalho, supra note 149, at 379-82.
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applications in a country requiring disclosure. Firms with
something to hide may prefer to patent their inventions in the
United States or the European Union, neither of which man-
date disclosure.5
e. Publication Rules
A developing country can fine-tune its patent laws in other
ways to discourage excessive patenting. For example, some
patent offices publish the application for a patent very soon af-
ter it is submitted to the patent office. 55 Other jurisdictions,
like the United States, keep applications secret for eighteen
months after filing,"' allowing owners to exploit their inven-
tions commercially without public disclosure. A firm that
wishes to keep its invention secret as long as possible will delay
filing in a jurisdiction that promptly publishes all applications.
Some firms, concerned about losing their trade secrets if the
application is published but the patent subsequently denied,
may not file at all. Early publication also ensures the quickest
dissemination of information to local innovators.
f Patent Opposition Procedures
Similarly, the legislature of a developing country member
can raise the cost of the application process and thereby dis-
courage patenting by allowing interested parties to oppose pat-
ent applications on the grounds that the claimed invention is
not new, useful, or, most importantly, nonobvious in light of the
prior art."' An added benefit of allowing interference proceed-
ings may include improving the quality of patents issued when
third parties bring relevant information to the attention of the
patent examiner. 15
154. As of 2000, the Andean Pact nations and Costa Rica had enacted a dis-
closure requirement. See id. at 375-76.
155. See Jeanette L. Pinard & Lian Chun-cheng, Patent Protection Under
Chinese Law, 1 J. CHINESE L. 69, 71 (1987) (discussing patent application pro-
cedure under the Chinese patent system).
156. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
157. American law currently does not provide for opposition procedures,
although the U.S. Patent Office does adjudicate priority disputes that arise
during the application process. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000). Of course, to the
extent that big firms can absorb the added costs better than small firms, al-
lowing opposition may not be desirable in a country with significant inventive
activity by small firms.
158. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 776-83 (2002) (advocating for the adoption of
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g. Passing on Administrative Costs
The most direct way for a developing country to raise the
cost of patenting (and an eminently fair one) is to force appli-
cants to bear all of the costs of the patent system. There is no
requirement in the TRIPS Agreement that members of the
WTO subsidize the patent application, examination, and en-
forcement process for inventors. A careful accounting should be
kept of (1) the costs of establishing and operating a patent of-
fice (including building and maintenance costs; the salaries of
examiners, administrators, and support staff; and the cost of
other office resources); (2) the cost of judicial time allocated to
adjudicating disputes; and (3) the cost of implementing border
control measures, impounding counterfeit goods, and other di-
rect policing expenditures. The fee structure in the patent office
of a developing country should at a minimum force applicants
to internalize all of these costs. The high price of patenting
would ensure careful consideration before filing and would dis-
courage some applicants altogether. 159 In addition, if the patent
law of a developing country requires the use of local translators
and patent agents, 6 ' further direct economic benefit to the local
economy accrues.
h. Disgorgement of Illegitimate Monopoly Profits
A developing country might also consider a type of reme-
dial legislation that makes patenting more risky and lowers the
cost of patent office error. The TRIPS Agreement is silent on
what follows from a judicial declaration that a patent is void.
When a patent office makes a mistake, the public sometimes
incurs a huge cost. Consider the U.S. Patent Office's erroneous
grant of a method patent to Eli Lilly for the therapeutic use of
the antidepressant drug Prozac.16' For years, purchasers of the
drug paid a monopoly price rather than a generic price, misdi-
recting billions of dollars to Eli Lilly. Nothing in the TRIPS
opposition proceedings in the U.S. Patent Office).
159. If fees were high enough, surplus monies could be directed to local re-
searchers in the form of grants. I am thankful to John Turner for suggesting
the relevance of efficient fee structuring in patent offices.
160. In 1992, the cost of patent agents' and translators' fees in some coun-
tries exceeded an average of $4000 per application. See Samson Helfgott, Why
Must Filing in Europe Be So Costly?, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 787,
788 (1994) (noting fees in Japan and selected European countries).
161. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 972 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding a process patent for increasing the uptake of serotonin void for
double patenting).
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Agreement would prevent a legislature from amending its pat-
ent law to include a disgorgement remedy that would force pat-
entees like Eli Lilly to return excess profits earned as a result
of patent office error. One could debate the proper parameters
of a disgorgement remedy-perhaps it should only be available
when the patentee failed to reveal relevant prior art-but the
provision of such a remedy for consumers would create incen-
tives for applicants to provide better information to examiners
and would discourage marginal applications. In a case of
fraudulent patenting in multiple jurisdictions, it might even be
possible to authorize courts to augment damages to take into
account an international pattern of abuse .' Faced with the
possibility of a high enough penalty, a company like Eli Lilly
would hesitate before filing a patent application in a jurisdic-
tion that provided for disgorgement.
i. A Final Note on Patent Legislation
All of the options discussed above reduce the costs of com-
plying with the patent sections of the TRIPS Agreement, either
by reducing the attractiveness of patenting or by minimizing
the costs to users and consumers of patented products. Al-
though economic logic and extant empirical evidence suggest
that adopting a minimalist strategy will not negatively affect
direct foreign investment-and may even stimulate investment
from those who wish to take advantage of a minimalist re-
gime-a change in the local economy may call for a change in
local patent law.16 3 For example, after South Korea achieved a
high degree of industrialization and developed an educated and
motivated workforce, it strengthened its intellectual property
laws at the request of local commercial interests. 6 1 Once an
economy is strong enough to support significant inventive activ-
ity, policy makers should rethink the state of their patent sys-
tem. Stronger laws may make a great deal of economic sense
for a country filled with adequately capitalized inventors. 165
162. Cf. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 350-51
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (permitting a court in an antitrust case to take into account
an international pattern of abuse).
163. See MASKUS, supra note 8, at 176-81.
164. Id. at 93.
165. See PCT Filings Grow by 71 Percent in Developing Countries, WIPO
MAG., Mar. 2002, at 9 (tracking increased patenting by China, India, South
Korea, Mexico, Algeria, Singapore, Brazil, and South Africa).
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2. Protection of Plant Varieties
The TRIPS Agreement does not require that members pro-
vide patent protection for plants. 6 Under Article 27(3)(b),
members may choose to provide "protection of plant varieties
[through] an effective sui generis system."167 Members clearly
have some leeway in interpreting "effective." This flexibility is
important, given the concerns of some developing countries
that strong protection for industrially engineered plant species,
as opposed to local land races or traditional knowledge about
plant genetic resources, poses a significant economic and envi-
ronmental threat.
Although some developing countries have complied with
TRIPS by enacting the International Convention for the Protec-
tion of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV),168 the TRIPS Agree-
ment does not mandate adherence to it. Some commentators
have complained that UPOV overprotects plant varieties and
seeds to the detriment of the developing world. UPOV is not the
only sort of legislation that might provide "effective" protection.
One could interpret "effective" in light of the policy goals set
forth in the TRIPS Agreement. In other words, protection
should further "public policy objectives ... including develop-
mental and technological objectives ... [and enable the least
developed members] to create a sound and viable technological
base."' 69 It should also "contribute to the promotion of techno-
logical innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare." 70 These objectives hardly dictate a nar-
row set of plant protection options to developing countries.
Moreover, one could interpret "effective" purely in terms of eco-
nomic incentives: A member must provide a reward adequate to
stimulate the successful research and development of plant va-
rieties.
A developing country could use either interpretation to jus-
166. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(3)(b) ("Members may also
exclude from patentability ... plants.").
167. Id.
168. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89, as amended on Mar. 19,
1991 [hereinafter UPOVI, available at http://www.upov.int/en/publications/
conventions/1991/pdf/act1991.pdf.
169. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.
170. Id. art. 7.
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tify a shorter term of protection than the twenty years con-
tained in UPOV.7' and to narrow the categories of plants avail-
able for protection. For example, a developing country might
require that a plant variety be nonobvious in light of the prior
art, a requirement not contained in UPOV172 or U.S. law.173 A
developing country might also require that a new plant variety
be an improvement over prior varieties, such as producing a
greater crop yield. Patent law does not contain a requirement
that a new invention be better than prior inventions, but
such a requirement for plants would arguably advance the pro-
gressive goals of the Preamble and Article 7 of the TRIPS
Agreement. It would also be consistent with the economic ra-
tionale of providing incentives for inventors to create valuable
new products for consumers.
Finally, the legislature of a developing country might con-
sider expressly reserving the right of a farmer who has legiti-
mately purchased protected seeds to save enough from her har-
vest to replant her fields the following season. UPOV contains a
provision giving members the option to allow seed saving, 75
and the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act permits the prac-
tice.
176
III. A RATIONAL JUDICIAL ROLE
With patent and plant variety protection, a legislature
alone can effect significant reform, but the TRIPS Agreement
leaves little statutory flexibility in the field of copyrights and
trademarks. In considering a rational strategic agenda for
171. UPOV, supra note 168, art. 19 (providing twenty-five-year term of pro-
tection for trees and vines; twenty years for other cultivars).
172. See id. arts. 6-9 (requiring only novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and
stability).
173. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000) (providing that sexually reproducing plant
varieties must be novel, uniform, distinct, and stable); 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000)
(stating that asexually reproducing plants must be distinct and new).
174. Early English decisions may have implied such a requirement. See
Darcy v. Allin, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1139 (Q.B. 1602) ("[Tlhe King may grant to
[an inventor] a monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects
may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by his in-
vention to the commonwealth: otherwise not."). Current law does not require
that an invention be "good," at least not in the sense of beneficial or better
than prior art; however, for a long while, English law denied patents to inven-
tions that were "mere improvements." See Bircot's Case, 3 Coke's Institutes
184 (Ex. 1572).
175. See UPOV, supra note 168, art. 15(2).
176. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
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copyright and trademark law, the judiciary has a critical role to
play. Much of the legitimate policing of welfare costs must oc-
cur in the courts. Since the judicial systems of developing coun-
tries have historically been weak, effective policing of intellec-
tual property costs may be directly tied to improvements in the
courts.
A. COPYRIGHT LAW OPTIONS
The TRIPS Agreement provides little flexibility regarding
the implementation of rules affecting copyrighted works.
Unlike patents, global protection for many existing copyrighted
works is included in the Agreement. Article 70 states that
"copyright obligations with respect to existing works shall be
solely determined under Article 18 of the Berne Convention, ' 7
which applies to "all works which... have not yet fallen into
the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of
the term of protection."171 Unlike with inventions, it seems im-
possible to argue that a new member of the WTO (or the Berne
Convention) begins its era of compliance with an unlimited
body of public domain works available for exploitation.
Perhaps the most critical choice that the TRIPS Agreement
denies developing countries is whether to protect computer
programs under a sui generis regime or patent law rather than
under copyright law. 179 A regime tailored to provide optimal in-
centives for the creation of software would probably provide
rights lasting no longer than the average commercial life of
software (by some estimates, as short as nine months to two
years). 180 A short term of protection would make a variety of
useful software available to industry, government offices, and
educational institutions in developing countries. 8" Even protec-
177. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 70(2).
178. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, art. 18(1), as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971 (amended
1979), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
179. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(1) ("Computer programs,
whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the
Berne Convention (1971).").
180. See Bradley Chamberlin, Service & Support: Knowing When It's Time,
LAN TIMES, Dec. 6, 1993, at 80, 1993 WL 2383152 (nine months); Lawrence D.
Graham & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment of Com-
puter Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, and Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 142 (1996) (two years).
181. The most up-to-date versions of Windows, Word, and WordPerfect, for
example, would not be available, but many prior very usable versions would
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tion under patent law expires after twenty years. 8 2 Instead, the
WTO mandates protection for the life of the author plus fifty
years.'83 In economic and actuarial terms, this is eternal protec-
tion.' Given the need for developing countries to use software
to improve their industrial infrastructure, governmental opera-
tions, and educational systems, Article 10(1) is possibly the
most oppressive provision in the entire TRIPS Agreement.
The express incorporation of the Berne Convention into the
TRIPS Agreement'8 5 further limits the flexibility of new WTO
members.1 8 6 The Berne Convention provides some express pro-
tection for user's rights,' but it also mandates long-term pro-
tection for a wide variety of works with no formal require-188
ments. A minimalist approach to copyright protection must
focus on enhancing user's rights-rather than narrowing cate-
gories of protected subject matter or imposing high substantive
criteria for protection-with the focus on computer software.
The economic concerns of a developing country are probably
more directly implicated by restrictions on the distribution of
software than by restrictions on the distribution of the newest
Metallica album.
1. Exhaustion/First Sale Doctrine
Under the TRIPS Agreement, a legislature may limit an
be.
182. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 33.
183. Id. art. 9(1) ("Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the
Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto."); see also Berne Conven-
tion, supra note 178, art. 7(1) ("The term of protection granted by this Conven-
tion shall be the life of the author and fifty years after his death.").
184. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 87, at 1172-74.
185. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 9.
186. See Berne Convention, supra note 178, art. 2(2) (fixation requirement
optional); id. art. 2(4) (optional to protect legislative and administrative texts);
id. art. 2(8) (protection does not extend to news of the day); id. art. 2bis(1) (op-
tional to protect political speeches); id. art. 7(4) (optional to protect photo-
graphic works for more than twenty-five years); id. art. 9(2) (allowing fair use
of protected works as optional).
187. See id. art. 9(2) (members may allow fair use of protected works); id.
art. 10(1) (exempting quotations "compatible with fair practice" from protec-
tion); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (stating that the Berne
Convention protection for artists' moral rights is not incorporated); id. art. 9(2)
(providing no copyright protection for "ideas, procedures, methods of operation
or mathematical concepts"); id. art. 10(2) (stating that copyright protection in
factual compilations "shall not extend to the data or material itself').
188. See Berne Convention, supra note 178, art. 5 ("The enjoyment and the
exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality.").
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intellectual property owner's ability to exercise continued con-
trol over a good after the time of the first sale of that good. The
first sale doctrine189 in the United States, for example, makes
possible the sale of cheap used compact discs and books because
copyright owners are barred from controlling their resale. In
the European Union, generally, an owner's intellectual prop-
erty rights are said to be exhausted by the first sale within the
European Union.9 0 By its own terms, the TRIPS Agreement
does not dictate exhaustion rules for its members, 91 and coun-
tries with low average per capita incomes are especially likely
to benefit from healthy resale markets. If the first sale of a
copyrighted good exhausts all rights apart from those granted
by copyright law, then a thriving market for used goods can be
stimulated. A judiciary, however, plays a key role in limiting
the scope of a copyright owner's reach by policing the type of
transaction that constitutes a "first sale."
Imagine a developing country that would like to encourage
a thriving market in cheap, used computer software. To under-
stand the complexities involved in stimulating such a market,
one must understand why markets for used software in the
United States and elsewhere have been stifled. In order to
avoid the first sale doctrine, many firms that sell software in
the United States label a transaction a "license" even though it
bears few attributes of a real license. Since a true licensing
agreement is not subject to the first sale doctrine, many buyers
are deterred from breaching standard terms in so-called "li-
censes" that forbid the resale of the software. The judiciary has
a prominent role to play here in identifying sham licenses and
in applying the exhaustion/first sale principle regardless of the
contractual label. It should be noted that the TRIPS Agreement
does not prevent a member of the WTO from looking beyond
the label of a transaction and evaluating whether the substance
189. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
190. See Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hart-
lauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4799, 2 C.M.L.R. 953 (1998)
(explaining that only sales made within the European Union exhaust the in-
tellectual property rights of the seller).
191. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6 ("[Nlothing in this Agree-
ment shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual prop-
erty rights."); see also Paul J. Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indica-
tions: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 656-59 (1996) (arguing that a doctrine of worldwide ex-
haustion of intellectual property rights would be most consistent with the
GATT objectives of reducing trade barriers).
290 [Vol 88:249
ASYMMETRY IN THE TRIPS GAME
of the deal itself is a true license or a disguised sale. Looking
beyond the express form of a transaction is a time-honored
practice in commercial law. Voluminous U.S. case law, for ex-
ample, discusses whether an agreement labeled a "lease" by the
parties is truly a lease or is really a disguised sale subject to a
security interest.
19 2
Not surprisingly, several recent U.S. decisions involving
the sale of software disregard the language of a purported li-
cense agreement and find that the first sale doctrine prevents
enforcement of its terms. For example, in Softman Products Co.
v. Adobe Systems Inc. ,'9 the court examined a purported license
in which the copyright owner prohibited the unbundling of its
software. The court began by affirming that "[iut is well-settled
that in determining whether a transaction is a sale, a lease, or
a license, courts look to the economic realities of the ex-
change." 94 After examining all of the facts surrounding the
transaction, the court found:
[Tihe transaction is in fact a sale rather than a license. For example,
the purchaser commonly obtains a single copy of the software, with
documentation, for a single price, which the purchaser pays at the
time of the transaction, and which constitutes the entire payment for
the "license." The license runs for an indefinite term without provi-
sions for renewal.... [D]istributors pay full value for the merchan-
dise and accept the risk that the software may be damaged or lost.
The distributors also accept the risk that they will be unable to resell
the product. The distributors then resell the product to other distribu-
tors in the secondary market. The secondary market and the ultimate
consumer also pay full value for the product, and accept the risk that
the product may be lost or damaged. This evidence suggests a trans-
fer of title in the good. The transfer of a product for consideration
192. See, e.g., Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Pappas, 946 F.2d 1258, 1262-63
(7th Cir. 1991) (finding a "lease" of four trailers to be a disguised sale); see also
U.C.C. § 1-201 (2003) (setting forth economic realities test for determining
whether an agreement is a lease or a secured sale).
193. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding a shrinkwrap license
prohibiting unbundling of software unenforceable under first sale doctrine).
194. Id. at 1084 ("Because we look to the economic realities of the agree-
ment, the fact that the agreement labels itself a license' and calls the pay-
ments 'royalties,' both terms that arguably imply periodic payment for the use
rather than sale of technology, does not control our analysis." (quoting Micro-
soft Corp. v. DAK Indus., 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995))). The court
further explained that "'[o]wnership of a copy should be determined based on
the actual character, rather than the label, of the transaction by which the
user obtained possession.'" Id. at 1086 (quoting RAYMOND NIMMER, THE LAW
OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1.18(1), at 1-103 (1992)); see also Novell, Inc. v.
CPU Distrib., Inc., No. H-97-2326, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9975, at *17 (S.D.
Tex. May 4, 2000) (finding purported license agreement to constitute a sale).
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with a transfer of title and risk of loss generally constitutes a sale.' 5
The typical transfer of software looks much like the trans-.
action characterized by the Softman court as a sale, not a li-
cense. In a jurisdiction where courts adopt this reasoning, ex-
haustion principles should void most attempts to constrain
buyers from reselling software, as well as void other contrac-
tual attempts to restrain what the buyer does with it. A devel-
oping country adopting the reasoning of the opinion will help
stimulate a legal market for cheap, used software. Adoption of
the Softman principle probably requires legislatures to act in
concert with the judicial branch. A legislature can enact a law
requiring exhaustion of rights after the first sale, but without a
judiciary willing to look past contractual labels, the effective-
ness of the law in creating resale markets will be blunted.
The value of interpretive tools becomes even clearer when
considering other ways in which contract law can be construed
to stimulate resale markets and prevent intellectual property
owners from exercising too much downstream control over their
goods.
2. Contract Law and Shrinkwrap/Clickwrap Terms
The sham license doctrine discussed immediately above de-
ters overreaching by software firms even when technology
transfer is negotiated between parties of equal bargaining
power. Other contract doctrines identify defects in the bargain-
ing process and can negate onerous nonnegotiated contract
terms, even where the agreement is an otherwise valid license.
For example, software firms often try to manipulate traditional
offer and acceptance doctrine to bind buyers to restrictive con-
tract terms. Unwrapping software shrinkwrap, 196 or clicking on
a screen icon in the course of a purchase, purports to constitute
an acceptance of the unread terms contained on the package or
somewhere online. 97 In this way, a software firm can extract
promises by buyers not to reverse engineer their software,' 9
195. Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
196. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The
'shrinkwrap license' gets its name from the fact that retail software packages
are covered in plastic or cellophane 'shrinkwrap."').
197. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforc-
ing arbitration clause printed on invoice that arrived with computer after it
was purchased over the phone).
198. See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 41, 77 (2001) ("[S]oftware
292 [Vol 88:249
ASYMMETRY IN THE TRIPS GAME
make a fair use of it, 99 or, in one famous clause, publicly criti-
cize the Microsoft Corporation.20 0 A debate currently rages in
the United States over the enforceability of shrinkwrap and
clickwrap licenses and the desirability of amending state laws
to accommodate them.201 The struggle is between consumers
and large software firms that use the restrictive terms to main-
tain their market position. Both users and competitors of these
firms have much to gain from contract law doctrines that deny
enforcement of contracts containing onerous, nonnegotiated
terms 202
Courts in developing countries can justify nonenforcement
of nonnegotiated contract terms by recognizing several catego-
ries of user's rights. Rights currently recognized in important
jurisdictions include the right to extract data from a protected
database,2 3 the right to reverse engineer software for the pur-
pose of extracting public domain material or improving com-
patibility,204 the right to copy for the purposes of parodying the
original work, the right to resell the work,2 6 and the general
shrinkwrap licenses now routinely include provisions that purport to require
surrender of a purchaser's fair use reverse engineering rights as a condition of
access to the program."). But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1988) (preempting state contract law to the extent it would en-
force shrinkwrap licenses that waived rights a user would otherwise have un-
der federal copyright law).
199. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 198, at 69 n.81 (discussing the "recent
history in the United States of mass market licenses that purport to abrogate
fair use and other user privileges").
200. See Microsoft FrontPage 2002 End-User License Agreement, DEM
version (July 1, 2001) ("You may not use the Software in connection with any
site that disparages Microsoft, MSN, MSNBC, Expedia or their products or
services . . ").
201. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995).
202. One might argue that creating a hostile environment for certain con-
tractual terms might deter software firms from entering the market. This
seems unlikely. For example, there have not been any reports of software
shortages in Texas, Louisiana, or Mississippi following the decision in Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., which preempted the enforcement of many
shrinkwrap licenses in those states. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). Nor is there
any reported shortage of software in jurisdictions around the world that sel-
dom enforce copyright law.
203. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
204. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (up-
holding a competitor's right to reverse engineer in order to create a compatible
product).
205. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-81 (1994) (dis-
cussing the right to parody a work without the owner's authorization).
206. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (per curiam) (striking
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right to permit reproduction that "do[es] not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do[es] not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder."20 7 This
last right, expressly reserved in the TRIPS Agreement, may be
used to justify other rights that could be protected against con-
tractual erosion.2 s In general, courts should be able to construe
the law of contracts to deny enforcement to contract terms that
give copyright owners rights greater than those provided by lo-
cal copyright legislation. Cooperation from the judicial branch,
however, is required to a degree not anticipated with suggested
patent law reform.
3. Signaling from the Courts
As a strategic matter, a judicial system that denies at-
tempts by software manufacturers to use contract law to sup-
press competition may want to send out other signals to reas-
sure copyright owners. Vigorously enforcing anti-bootlegging
and counterfeiting laws (a notorious problem in China, for ex-
ample)2 9 is one way for a judiciary to demonstrate that it takes
its obligations seriously. Limiting access to cheap copies of for-
eign music and movies is likely to do far less damage to the lo-
cal economy than limiting access to business and manufactur-
ing software. Countries with a significant number of firms that
engage in the illegal copying of entertainment products may see
a negative short-term economic impact when those plants are
shut down, 210 but enforcement is mandated by TRIPS, and it
may well benefit local musicians, record companies, and film-
down a contractual restriction on a buyer's right to resell a book below the
price mandated by the copyright owner).
207. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 13.
208. Many jurisdictions allow judges to focus directly on the degree of ac-
tual consent present in a particular transaction. For example, when software
is ordered and paid for over the phone, it sometimes arrives with an invoice
containing additional contractual terms. Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement re-
quires members of the WTO to construe their contract law to imply consent to
terms that come to light only after an apparent agreement has been reached.
That U.S. courts are split on enforceability in this context indicates that a de-
veloping country could in good faith require actual consent to surprising or on-
erous contract terms in software licenses. Compare Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing post-purchase arbitration term), with
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. WYSE Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (per cu-
riam) (refusing to enforce postpurchase limitation of warranties).
209. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of
China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2000).
210. See MASKUS, supra note 8, at 157-59 (analyzing potential economic
effects in Lebanon of closing counterfeiting firms).
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makers. Anecdotal evidence provides some support for this pre-
diction. 2 1 Developing countries are hotbeds for new music,
212
and strengthening copyright protection in the market for enter-
tainment products probably stimulates local creativity in a way
that strengthening patent law does not because industrial and
technological endeavors require so much more capital.
B. TRADEMARK LAW OPTIONS
Members of the WTO have few choices about the scope of
their trademark law under the TRIPS Agreement. Variations
in levels of protection among nations will come from the will-
ingness of their courts to enforce laws against infringers.
Trademark law, therefore, provides another opportunity for a
judiciary to signal a strong commitment to the TRIPS Agree-
ment. Fortunately, this signal can be sent without imposing in-
ordinate costs on local manufacturers or consumers. In theory,
traditional trademark law does not impose significant monop-
oly costs,21 being primarily designed to reduce consumer confu-
sion and protect goodwill. Strong enforcement of anti-
counterfeiting legislation should mean that buyers will have
the choice between buying, for example, a pair of authentic
brand name jeans or a cheaper, less famous, and possibly pi-
rated, brand. Trademark law gives no one a monopoly in selling
jeans and allows local manufacturers to communicate accu-
rately the source and quality of their goods to the public.214 A
jurisdiction that takes a minimalist approach to the protection
of patents and computer software may find taking a maximalist
approach to trademark law to be a valuable and relatively cost-
less political strategy.2 5 Despite this recommendation that
211. Id.
212. See World Intellectual Property Organization, An Anti-Piracy Pro-
gram for Africa's Music Industry, WIPO MAG., Sept. 2002, at 10 (discussing
piracy problems encountered by the growing African recording industry).
213. But see Heald & Sherry, supra note 87, at 1161 & n.338.
214. One commentator explained the situation in Lebanon:
Innovation through product development and entry of new firms
seems to be stymied in part by weak trademark protection in poor na-
tions.... Firms in the apparel industry [in Lebanon] claim to have a
strong interest in designing clothing of high quality and style for
Middle Eastern markets. Their attempts to do so have been frus-
trated by trademark infringement by smaller firms in Lebanon and in
neighboring countries ....
MASKUS, supra note 8, at 148.
215. Id. at 149 ("[It seems that trademark infringement significantly and
negatively affects innovative Chinese enterprises.").
2003] 295
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
courts strongly enforce trademark rights, two points should be
made.
1. Thriving Counterfeiting Regimes
Protecting trademarks in countries where knockoff goods
are pervasive may impose costs on local counterfeiters when
fashion-conscious consumers choose to buy from foreign trade-
mark owners previously discouraged from entering the mar-
ketplace. In theory, a jurisdiction could try to preserve this
market by emphasizing that Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement
requires only that remedies be provided to trademark owners
when consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the1216
goods. In a country like China, where counterfeit goods domi-S211
nate the market, one could argue that consumers are unlikely
to assume that a good bearing a foreign trademark is authentic.
In other words, rampant suspicion inherent in some markets
could rebut the TRIPS-mandated presumption that the use of
identical marks on identical goods is likely to cause confu-
son.2 A country with a pervasive counterfeit market that re-
quires strict proof of likelihood of confusion might plausibly
continue to permit the local manufacture and sale of counterfeit
goods, especially if it requires disclosure of the unauthentic na-
ture of the goods.21 9 This justification, however, relies on a
technical reading of Article 16 that would directly frustrate the
goals of the TRIPS Agreement in a way that other arguments
offered in this Article do not.220 Even if toleration of counterfeit-
216. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16(1) (providing that mem-
bers must prohibit the use of "identical or similar signs for goods or services
which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is
registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion").
-217. See Chow, supra note 209.
218. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
219. The only section of the TRIPS Agreement that mentions counterfeiting
in the absence of a confusion requirement merely requires members to provide
border control measures that are effective to prevent the importation of the
goods. See id. art. 51 (members shall "adopt procedures to enable a right
holder, who has valid grounds for suspecting that the importation of counter-
feit trademark or pirate of copyright goods may take place, to lodge an applica-
tion.., for the suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free
circulation of such goods"). Although Article 51 speaks only to preventing im-
portation, if all members comply, an export ban is also essentially in effect.
220. Thus leaving the door open for a nonviolation complaint to be filed
with the WTO. See generally Tuan N. Samahon, TRIPS Copyright Dispute Set-
tlement After the Transition and Moratorium: Nonviolation and Situation
Complaints Against Developing Countries, 31 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 1051
(2000) (examining potential nonviolation and situation complaints for inade-
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ing might sometimes be theoretically justified, it is bound to at-
tract serious complaints before the WTO.
As a further note of caution, foreign investors may care
about the state of a country's trademark law when that country
contains a large number of consumers. If corporations like Nike
or The Gap are unwilling to open stores and manufacture goods
in a country that condones counterfeiting, then an open and ef-
fective crackdown on counterfeiters may change their minds.
Increased investment may be especially plausible in markets
like clothing and footwear that are particularly susceptible to
counterfeiting and that do not demand a highly trained and
educated workforce.
2. Protecting Product Configurations
Under Antidilution Law
One interpretation of trademark law may impose signifi-
cant costs on consumers, but courts in developing countries can
easily avoid it. The United States, and much of the rest of the
world, protects "famous" marks from unauthorized commercial
uses that cause "dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark"
even in the absence of a likelihood of consumer confusion. 22' The
cautious use of dilution doctrine to protect word marks would
not seem to involve significant costs-a local coffee shop
owner's inability to call itself the "Kodak Caf" should not have
a serious economic impact on a developing economy. Costs may
be higher, however, when the doctrine is used to protect prod-
uct shapes and configurations. Unfortunately, some courts in
the United States have begun to extend trademark dilution
protection to product configurations222 absent proof of likely
consumer confusion.222 This extension poses a greater threat to
quate copyright protection under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing).
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (codifying the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act of 1995).
222. Trademark law generally protects any "sign, or any combination of
signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from
those of other undertakings." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 15(1).
When the shape of a product communicates to consumers that it comes from a
unique source, then it functions as a trademark and is entitled to protection.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Famous protected configurations include the
Coca-Cola bottle and the hood ornament of the Rolls-Royce automobile. See,
e.g., Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 698
(N.D. Ga. 1976) (holding that the "Flying Lady" hood ornament identifies
Rolls-Royce as the manufacturer of a vehicle under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).




Although the definition of "trademark" in the TRIPS
Agreement is broad enough to include product configurations, 24
the trademark articles do not require members to adopt dilu-
tion protection. Although some commentators have opined that
Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement requires members to pro-
tect famous trademarks from dilution, 225 a close examination of
its language reveals no such requirement. Article 16(3) pro-
vides that "Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall ap-
ply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or services which are not simi-
lar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered."226 If
we insert not similar into Article 6bis of the Paris Convention,
it reads:
[Members shall] prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion,
of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of reg-
istration or use to be well-known in that country as being already the
mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used
for identical or similar [or not similar] goods.227
It is difficult to see how incorporating this section, which
specifically requires a likelihood of confusion, requires mem-
bers to enact laws that provide protection in the absence of con-
fusion. In fact, Article 16 further narrows liability to situations
where the "use of [a] trademark in relation to... goods or ser-
vices would indicate a connection between those goods or ser-
vices and the owner of the registered trademark and.., the in-
terests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be
damaged by such use."22 18 What seems to be required is protec-
tion against what U.S. law refers to as confusion as to "spon-
1545 (S.D. Miss. 1996), affd, 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (enjoining manufac-
ture of a stand mixer on "likelihood of confusion" grounds only). For an analy-
sis of the opinion, see Paul J. Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend
Co., Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Prod-
uct Configurations, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415 (1998).
224. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 15(1) (protecting any
.sign... capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking
from those of other undertakings").
225. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellec-
tual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement,
29 INT'L LAW. 345, 363 (1995). But see Heald, supra note 191, at 654-55 (argu-
ing that "no federal cause of action for dilution is necessary to harmonize
[U.S.] domestic law with the TRIPS Agreement").
226. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16(3) (emphasis added).
227. Paris Convention, supra note 127, art. 6bis(1) (emphasis added).
228. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16(3).
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sorship or approval."229 Courts in developing countries should
be able to resist dilution protection altogether, creating yet an-
other bargaining chip to use with foreign firms.
IV. A RATIONAL EXECUTIVE (OR AGENCY) AGENDA
Depending on its governmental structures, a developing
country may perform the executive function through different
mechanisms, ranging from a unitary executive to a diffuse one
functioning through multiple agencies, to some combination
thereof. Regardless of the particulars of governmental struc-
ture, the executive will sometimes be the most effective monitor
of the welfare costs imposed by compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement.
A. ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW
Although much enforcement of antitrust law in the United
States occurs in the federal courts through private causes of ac-
tion, in many countries regulatory agencies are the primary
watchdogs of anticompetitive behavior.230 A competent adminis-
trative agency or other executive body can reduce some of the
costs of intellectual property law by policing abusive owners
under antitrust principles. And, since antitrust law is under-
developed or nonexistent in much of the nonindustrialized
world,23' placing oversight responsibility with a specialized
agency, rather than with a diffuse judiciary, may be particu-
larly appropriate.
1. Policing Patent Owners
Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that "[n]othing
in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in
their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in
particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant
market."2 32 The WTO affirms that governments can "prevent
patent owners and other holders of intellectual property rights
from abusing intellectual property rights, 'unreasonably' re-
straining trade, or hampering the international transfer of
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000); Heald, supra note 191, at 642.
230. David J. Gerber, Competition Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 263, 275
(2002).
231. See Reichman, supra note 21, at 25-26.
232. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 40(2).
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technology."233 Professor Reichman has suggested that the de-
veloping world has much to gain from waving the flag of free
and fair competition in the face of multinational intellectual
property monopolies.234
For example, some multinational agricultural firms con-
tract around laws permitting seed saving by farmers. Seed sell-
ers in the United States frequently require farmers to promise
not to save sufficient seed to plant for a subsequent harvest.235
In a highly competitive seed market, the attempt to contract
around a statutory seed-saving exception 236 is probably incon-
sequential. If farmers do not like the contractual term, they can
buy unpatented seeds or turn to a competitor who permits seed
saving. However, if a single patented product dominates the
market or firms do not compete in their contractual terms,
237
then a governmental agency might be justified in intervening
and declaring anti-seed-saving clauses in private contracts void
as anticompetitive.
United States law provides other doctrines that police anti-
competitive behavior by intellectual property owners. In Image
Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co.,238 the Ninth Circuit
found that Kodak's refusal to sell patented photocopy machine
parts to independent repair services violated the Sherman Act.
Although refusal-to-deal cases are controversial, it is difficult to
argue that the TRIPS Agreement prohibits members from tak-
233. World Trade Organization Information and Media Relations Division,
Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents, Obligations and
Exceptions (Apr. 2001), at http://www.wto.orgfenglish/tratop-e/trips-e/
factsheet~pharm02-e.htm.
234. See Reichman, supra note 21, at 25-26 (arguing that, in implementing
the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries should "shoulder the pro-
competitive mantle that the developed countries have increasingly abandoned"
and "seek to maintain the maximum amount of competition in their domestic
markets that is consistent with a good faith implementation of the interna-
tional minimum standards of intellectual property protection").
235. See generally Nicole C. Nachtigal, Note, A Modern David and Goliath
Farmer v. Monsanto: Advising a Grower on the Monsanto Technology Agree-
ment 2001, 6 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 50 (2001) (discussing the
Monsanto Technology Agreement, which bars growers from saving any of
Monsanto's "Roundup Ready" genetically engineered seeds to replant during
the next growing season).
236. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
237. For example, if form contracts used by all seed producers require a
promise not to save seeds. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d
69 (N.J. 1960) (criticizing the form contract employed by the three biggest auto
manufacturers to limit consumer warranties).
238. 125 F.3d 1195, 1209-11 (9th Cir. 1997).
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ing action when patent owners with significant market power
refuse to deal with competitors. In another case, the Federal
Circuit held that a patent owner with the requisite market
power can violate antitrust law by deliberately and unjustifia-
bly designing a product to be incompatible with a competi-
tor's.239 Again, deciding when such conduct should be considered
predatory is hotly debated, but correcting market distortions
created by patent owners seems squarely within the letter and
spirit of Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement. Perhaps the best
example of antitrust scrutiny of an intellectual property owner
involves the continuing litigation brought against Microsoft by
the U.S. Department of Justice, 240 a case that will be discussed
in a moment when we turn our attention to copyright law.
Although an overly enthusiastic embrace of antitrust law
might "reduce incentives for firms to invest in a reforming
economy,"241 judicious use of competition principles could lower
the cost of technology transfer to the developing world.242
2. Policing Copyright Owners
A valid copyright seldom gives its owner significant market
power, defined as the ability to raise prices and dictate contrac-
tual terms as if it had little or no competition.243 Even if the
newest record by They Might Be Giants or the newest Flash-
man novel by George MacDonald Fraser are the best in their
respective fields, they will be sold for about the same price and
under the same terms as their less eloquent competition. There
is seldom a valid antitrust reason to intervene in markets for
copyrighted goods. The most important exception to this rule,
however, is computer software. Because software functions like
a machine,244 it can dominate a market if it is a superior prod-
239. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
240. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per cu-
riam).
241. See A.E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Limits to Antitrust Policy for
Reforming Economies, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 311, 312 (1996).
242. In general, an agency may be better off focusing on actual incidents of
market abuse by firms with significant market power, rather than regulating
complex technology transfers between foreign and local firms. See generally
Kanaan A1-Ahmar, The New Transfer of Technology Rules in Egypt, 32 IIC 519
(2001) (criticizing Egyptian attempts to regulate complex transactions involv-
ing intellectual property).
243. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51.
244. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
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uct (like TurboTax) or it has become a de facto standard (like
Microsoft Windows). The United States and the European Un-
ion are currently breaking new ground in the regulation of Mi-
crosoft, and developing countries should consider following suit.
In United States v. Microsoft Corp. 245 the D.C. Circuit af
firmed that the Microsoft Windows operating system possessed
monopoly power and that Microsoft maintained its position
through anticompetitive practices. The court found that Mi-
crosoft's attempt to defend itself on grounds that it owned a
valid copyright "border[ed] upon the frivolous."247 It held that
several of the provisions of its original equipment manufacturer
and Internet access provider licenses were anticompetitive and
remanded for further consideration of the government's claim
that Microsoft illegally tied the sale of its operating system to
the sale of its Internet Explorer browser. The European Union
also announced that it will take action against Microsoft for
"discriminatory licensing and refusal to supply information re-
garding its software."24 Although both of these actions are
likely to continue for some time (under very different sets of
rules governing competition)249, it is increasingly clear that Mi-
crosoft's conduct in the software market will be closely regu-
lated. Microsoft may eventually be sanctioned for illegal tying,
stifling innovation through intentional incompatibility, preda-
tory pricing, failure to license, and other refusals to deal. 25 0 U.S.
and E.U. oversight of Microsoft provides a valuable example of
how a developing country-that may have a gross national
product smaller than Microsoft's gross yearly income-can re-
1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543-44 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (en banc).
245. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 45.
246. Id. at 78-79.
247. Id. at 63.
248. Justin O'Dell, Note, Trouble Abroad: Microsoft's Antitrust Problems
Under the Law of the European Union, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101, 101
(2001); see also EU Accuses Microsoft of Abusing Dominance To Squeeze Out
Rivals, 79 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1971, at 131, 147 (Aug. 11,
2000).
249. O'Dell, supra note 248, at 118-28 (noting that the antitrust and
regulatory systems of the European Union and the United States differ greatly
and analyzing the European Union statutory provisions and regulatory
systems that provide the structure for judicial decisions); see also STEPHEN
KINSELLA, EU TECHNOLOGY LICENSING (photo. reprint 1999) (1998);
VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE (6th ed. 1997).
250. See O'Dell, supra note 248, at 131-34 (alleging Microsoft's abuses of
its dominant position).
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duce the cost of protecting software.
Applying antitrust scrutiny to software may have other
benefits for developing countries. Currently, many software
owners, including Microsoft, keep their source code secret, in
part to make it more difficult for competitors to make compati-
ble products. Although reverse engineering a piece of software
to uncover its underlying object code is relatively easy, it can-
not usually be recompiled into a precise copy of the original
source code used by its programmers. For this reason, writing
interoperable software is a challenge and users lament, "Win-
dows doesn't like WordPerfect" or "Windows doesn't like Net-
scape." 5 ' One suggested remedy would force Microsoft to make
the source code of its Windows operating system freely avail-
252
able to its competitors, a move that would increase both the
quality and quantity of Windows-compatible software. Until
the time that the United States or European Union forces such
a disclosure, any country willing to demand publication of the
Windows source code on plausible antitrust grounds should
gain leverage over the software giant.
The TRIPS Agreement would not stand in the way of
forced disclosure of secret source code because Article 40 of the
TRIPS Agreement clearly states that "[niothing in this Agree-
ment shall prevent Members from specifying in their [national]
legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particu-
lar cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights
having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant mar-
ket."253 In the proper circumstances, Article 40 would seem to
authorize a member of the WTO to order revelation of a trade
secret. Article 39 on trade secrets only requires that members
protect owners of confidential information from disclosure "in a
manner contrary to honest commercial practices."5 4 This does
not expressly preclude disclosure forced pursuant to a valid
court order after a finding of anticompetitive conduct. The only
251. See, e.g, Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 65 ("[T]he District Court found
that Microsoft designed Windows 98 'so that using Navigator on Windows 98
would have unpleasant consequences for users.'" (citations omitted)).
252. Barry J. Lipson, Thoughts on Terrorist Legislation, 25 LAW. J. 7, 7
(2001) ("[Tihe Honorable Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, informed Microsoft that if a
settlement was not reached any remedies against the company would be 'the
harshest and broadest possible.'" A subsequent judge in the litigation "inti-
mated that these 'harshest' remedies could include the opening of the Win-
dows source code to competitors." (citations omitted)).
253. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 40(2).
254. Id. art. 39(2).
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express obligation on governmental agencies is to maintain the
secrecy of data submitted to obtain marketing approval for
pharmaceuticals or chemical products.255 In a situation where a
failure to disclose a secret such as the Windows source code has
"adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dis-
semination of technology, "251 it seems likely that the competi-
tive principle of Article 40 would trump the right to secrecy es-
tablished in Article 39.
B. STRATEGIC EXECUTIVE INITIATIVES
In addition to regulating intellectual property owners, ex-
ecutive branch decision makers can significantly reduce the
welfare costs of intellectual property laws by engaging in
imaginative strategic initiatives.
1. Building Intellectual Property Power
in the Developing World: Linux and Gene Banks
Developing countries can help themselves by taking advan-
tage of technology that is distributed for free. Mexico, for ex-
ample, has mandated use of the Linux computer operating sys-
tem in all of its government offices and public schools. 257 Linux
is an operating system distributed for free with the source code
available for programmers to adapt.258 It occupies much less
drive space than Windows and can therefore be run on older,
slower computers. It is generally considered to be more reliable
and secure than Windows. Approximately sixty percent of the
world's servers use a version of Linux called Apache. 2 9 A great
deal of free software has been written to run on the Linux op-
erating system, and support for programmers is widely avail-
able in many different languages.26 °
Beyond the obvious cost savings, choosing Linux should be
appealing to a developing country for several other reasons.
255. Id. art. 39(3).
256. Id. art. 40(1).
257. See Leander Kahney, Mexican School Systems Embrace Linux,
WIRED (Nov. 6, 1998), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,16107,00.html.
258. See Open Source Initiative, at http://www.opensource.org (last visited
Sept. 25, 2003).
259. See Netcraft, at http://www.netcraft.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
260. See GNU's Not Unix!, at http://www.gnu.org (last modified Sept. 10,
2003) (information on Linux variant); Open Source Initiative, at
http://www.opensource.org (last visited Sept. 25, 2003) (information on free
software and Linux-compatible systems).
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First, because it can be run on older computers, it can be made
more widely available to users than Windows. More impor-
tantly, because the source code is open, it invites local pro-
grammers to experiment and adapt it. Perhaps the easiest way
for a country to foster creativity and technological development
is to encourage the adoption of Linux as its standard operating
system. If the developing world chooses Linux, it would result
in an entire generation of programmers and software inde-
pendent of Microsoft, a generation with a different ethic and a
more creative problem-solving ability. This is why one famous
internal Microsoft memo labeled Linux the greatest threat to
its hegemony in the field of software.261 Imagine the United
States losing its preeminent global position in the production of
computer geeks!
Developing countries have also adapted creatively to the
dominance in seed production and sales by a small number of
large international agricultural firms. A system of gene banks
has been created around the world to help preserve the diver-
sity of a wide variety of different crops. 26 2 Most of these gene
banks are located in developing countries, where the widest va-
riety of plant germ plasm is usually found.263 In addition to col-
lecting plant DNA, the Indian government is establishing a da-
tabase of traditional knowledge about plant genetic
resources.2 64 The information stored in these databases could
provide the raw material for a counteroffensive against the ag-
ricultural hegemony enjoyed by a few firms. On the other hand,
gene banks could be utilized cooperatively as income sources
through the selling of germ plasm needed for research pur-
poses. Income appears to be part of the motivation behind the
recent formation of human gene storage facilities.265 One report
261. Marcus Maher, Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative
Intellectual Property Paradigm, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 619, 682 n.296 (1999-2000) ("Microsoft has itself expressed the view that
Linux poses a threat."); Chris Oakes, MS: Open Source Is Direct Threat,
WIRED, at http://www.wired.connews/technology/0,1282,15990,00.html (last
modified Nov. 2, 1998) (noting Microsoft's acknowledgment of the validity of
the Halloween memos and recognizing the threat open source software poses
to Microsoft).
262. NAZAREA, supra note 105, at 6 (showing the geographic distribution of
major gene banks).
263. See id.
264. See V.K. Gupta, An Approach for Establishing a TKDL, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. RTs. 307 (2000), http://www.patentmatics.com/pub2002/pub69.htm.
265. Andreas Schrell & Nils Heide, Licensing Estonian Genes: The Human
Genes Act Has Entered into Force, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 337 (2002) (ex-
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on a new government-sponsored Estonian gene bank concludes
that "the international research community and the pharma-
ceutical industry will welcome Estonia's offer with open
arms."266 Whether they are intended to obtain leverage over
multinational corporations or capture some of the huge world-
wide profits, the creation of gene banks and knowledge banks is
a rational response to TRIPS.
2. Developing a Library Strategy
As regards to computer software, the TRIPS Agreement
requires members to "prohibit the commercial rental to the
public of originals or copies of their copyright works."2 6' Noth-
ing, however, expressly prevents the executive branch of the
government of a developing country from making copies of
software freely available through public libraries. In fact, the
inclusion of such express language in the TRIPS Agreement
prohibiting only "commercial rental" may even imply that free
lending by public libraries is permitted. Making copies of basic
business and word processing software widely available
through a system of free lending would be an inexpensive way
to disseminate technology. Software firms, of course, would
worry that the open lending of software would facilitate wide-
spread copying by individuals. Infringement would undoubt-
edly occur, but as long as adequate and expeditious remedies
were available to rights holders, the enforcement provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement would be met. 68
Software firms would also undoubtedly argue that either
remedy against individual infringers would be ineffective and
therefore vicarious or contributory liability should be available
against public lending institutions. Two responses could be of-
fered by the developing world. First, secondary liability would
only be proper when the library has actual knowledge that a
patron plans to make an illegal copy of the software rather
than merely use it and return it.26 An actual knowledge stan-
plaining the regulation of Estonian human genetic database).
266. Id. at 339.
267. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 11.
268. See id. art. 41 ("Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as
specified in this Part are available under their [national] law so as to permit
effective action against any act of infringement . . . including expeditious
remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent
to further infringements.").
269. The importance of the prior discussion of exhaustion of rights and
other contract doctrines that limit overreaching by copyright owners is clear at
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dard is difficult to meet, and constructive knowledge of in-
fringement could be eliminated American-style, with a statu-
tory exemption for libraries that post adequate copyright warn-
270ings.
A different sort of justification for protecting public lending
institutions from contributory liability is based on the U.S.
position regarding immunity for state actors. Nothing in the
TRIPS Agreement makes member states liable for infringe-
ment of intellectual property rights, even if the state itself is a
direct infringer. The United States Supreme Court recently
held that U.S. states are immune in cases brought under fed-
eral copyright, patent, and trademark law271 and would un-
doubtedly hold that the federal government would enjoy similar
immunity in the absence of a waiver. 72 A member of the WTO
does not have to make itself amenable to suit in its own courts,
which leaves copyright owners to lobby their governments to
invoke the TRIPS dispute resolution procedures on their behalf.
It may be politically difficult for the home states of large soft-
ware firms to advocate a crackdown on the lending practices of
libraries in developing countries. In any event, it is at least
plausible for a developing country to take the position that
lending software with adequate anti-infringement warnings
does not violate the letter or the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement.
V. A RATIONAL DIPLOMATIC/FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AGENDA
Branches of government frequently have greater bargain-
ing power than individuals or even large businesses. This bar-
gaining power should not be forgotten when negotiations are
entered into with intellectual property owners. For example, in
the context of pharmaceuticals, many countries reduce the cost
of patents by establishing a single buyer for drugs, usually the
agency in charge of administering a regime of socialized medi-
cine. When the negotiating power of a government is employed
to purchase enough of a particular drug to satisfy the needs of a
large population, it is possible to acquire it for less than full
this point. Lending in and of itself would be wrongful in a jurisdiction that
permitted enforcement of licenses that restrict the right to loan or resell soft-
ware.
270. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(d) (2000).
271. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).




To adopt the terminology of Professors Reichman and
Lange, playing within the framework of the TRIPS Agreement
is a "non-cooperative game." 73 After demonstrating the obvious
fact that strong enforcement of intellectual property rights fa-
vors those who produce the goods protected by those rights,
they predict that:
A comparative disadvantage with respect to trade in knowledge goods
will, in turn, compel most developing and least-developed countries to
adopt defensive strategies for implementing the TRIPS Agreement, to
reduce its resulting social costs and tensions, even as they strive to
maximize their gains from the WTO Agreement as a whole.274
One rational defensive strategy is for developing countries
to comply in a minimalist manner and then to "bargainH
around the TRIPS Agreement"275 with private firms. Each de-
fensive strategy disadvantageous to a foreign intellectual prop-
erty owner creates a bargaining chip that can be expended in
return for foreign investment, importation of technology, or
other direct aid. A developing country can accomplish a great
deal by carefully shaping its intellectual property laws in con-
cert with an aggressive diplomatic strategy.
A. ENGAGING FOREIGN RIGHTS HOLDERS
A developing country can offer concessions and other ac-
commodations to a private firm when its intellectual property
law creates a disadvantage for that firm.276 The willingness to
adapt and compromise creates opportunities to leverage capital
investment, technology transfer, or other types of aid from dis-
advantaged firms. The only limit on bargaining initiatives is
the imagination:
(i) As noted earlier, a patent may not be enforceable in a
country for many reasons, ranging from the failure to file a
timely application, to the failure of the invention to fit into a
category of patentable subject matter.277 To the extent that dis-
273. Reichman & Lange, supra note 4, at 17.
274. Id. at 18.
275. I am grateful to Professors Reichman and Lange for introducing me to
this apt phrase.
276. Id. at 27 ("Nothing impedes developing-country governments from en-
couraging privately negotiated concessions to foreign firms that are contractu-
ally exchanged for reciprocal benefits to their own firms or to specific economic
sectors.").
277. See supra notes 109-40 and accompanying text (discussing categories
of subject matter that members of the WTO have the choice not to protect).
[Vol 88:249308
ASYMMETRY IN THE TRIPS GAME
advantaged foreign firms desire increased rights, they should
be willing to impart with some consideration to obtain them.
Imagine firm A has invented a popular new tire that provides
particularly good traction in mud and sand. It has an enforce-
able patent in the United States and Europe, but due to coun-
try B's strict novelty requirement, it failed to make a timely
application in country B's nascent patent office. It currently
does not sell its tires in country B because its production and
import costs would price buyers out of the market. It has con-
sidered opening a plant in country B to lower those costs, but in
the absence of patent protection for its product, it worries
whether it will be able to recoup the cost of expansion. In other
words, competition by another firm would be disastrous. Coun-
try B might rationally offer firm A the exclusive right to sell its
tires as part of a package to attract the new plant.""
(ii) This Article encourages developing countries to comply
with and effectively enforce the TRIPS Agreement; it does not
advocate formal compliance accompanied by a widespread fail-
ure to enforce intellectual property rights. Some commentators
have noted, however, that lapses in enforcement nonetheless
create bargaining chips.27 ' For example, given the widespread
availability of infringing music in China-and the disingenuous
nature of enforcement efforts there-a seller of music like Sony
might be willing to open a compact disc pressing plant in an
economically depressed area of China in return for a credible
commitment to vigorous enforcement of its copyrights. Develop-
ing countries with significant counterfeiting industries should
consider pursuing a strategy that would legitimize its extant
manufacturing capacity by co-opting rights holders whenever
possible.8
(iii) A firm may hesitate to license its technology to another
firm (or even one of its subsidiaries) in a developing country if
the license would not be enforceable due to principles of anti-
278. Even if there is a local competitor, the local economy might benefit
from the existence of two firms, one to service the high-end tire market and
the other to service the lower.
279. See Reichman, supra note 95, at 468 (offering a hypothetical that en-
visions "the conversion of alleged pirates into authorized licensees of the intel-
lectual property [owner]").
280. See Rochelle Dreyfuss & Andreas Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 275, 327 (1997) (arguing an intellectual property owner "may gain
more by licensing to the... 'trademark pirate' than by fighting him through to
the end under the WTO system").
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trust or contract law. As noted above, developing countries
have significant flexibility in the enforcement of licenses."'
Imagine that firm A has written a new software program that
creates substantial efficiencies in bank record keeping, but it
hesitates to license the technology in country B because of its
aggressive competition laws. In return for an exemption from
antitrust scrutiny, firm A may be willing to do more than sell
its software to the banks that can afford it-it may also be will-
ing to provide other software at a reduced cost to local busi-
nesses or schools. The deals that might be facilitated are
bounded only by the imagination of negotiators for firms and
government representatives.
It may be especially easy to cut beneficial deals with own-
ers of software because of the exceptionally low marginal cost of
producing it once programming and debugging have been ac-
complished. In other words, if a software firm has already re-
couped its research and development costs by selling to firms in
the United States and the European Union, the marginal profit
from further transactions overseas will be very high. The size of
the profit margin should, in theory, make software firms more
flexible in making concessions necessary to enter a new mar-
ket.
(iv) As noted above, a developing country that adopts a
minimal compliance strategy puts itself in a strong negotiating
position. Not only can it seek concessions beneficial to local
firms, but it can also credibly request direct aid in the form of
computer equipment for government offices (starting with the
patent and trademark office and local courts), technical assis-
tance, judicial training, and other resources necessary to insti-
tution building, especially at local schools and universities.2
Imagine firm A desires to expand its sales of gaming and basic
business software in country B. Because of the open availability
281. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
282. See Joseph Straus, Comment, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agree-
ment: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide
Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 91, 105 (1998)
("A number of well-known examples exist for such cooperative agreements be-
tween U.S. companies and universities and publicly administered or funded
institutions in Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Ni-
geria, and Suriname." (citing Joshua P. Rosenthal, Equitable Sharing of Bio-
diversity Benefits: Agreements on Genetic Resources, in 1997 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE OECD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INCENTIVE MEASURES FOR THE
CONSERVATION AND THE SUSTAINABLE USE OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN
CAIRNS, AUSTRALIA 253 (1997))).
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of used software in the country and the concomitant high levels
of individual infringement, sales are stagnant. Consumers will
not buy new software at full price when they can buy it used for
less or borrow from the library and make a copy. In return for a
strictly enforced ban on the resale and lending of gaming soft-
ware, firm A may be willing to distribute copies of its basic
business software package (word processing, network commu-
nications, etc.) to government offices and schools around the
country, especially if it plans to substantially upgrade that
software in the future.
(v) Policy makers in developing countries must constantly
engage foreign firms with two key questions: What do you
want? What will you give us in exchange? It is the flexibility
inherent in the TRIPS Agreement that provides developing
countries with something to exchange. In theory, a developing
country could also engage foreign governments in negotiations,
but dealing directly with firms has many advantages. First,
granting special privileges to a private firm does not normally
implicate the Most-Favoured Nation Treatment 83 and National
Treatment 284 articles of the TRIPS Agreement, which prevent
discrimination among nationals of the WTO. Members are freer
to pick and choose among firms than among other nations. Sec-
ond, negotiations between nations are often more prolonged
and politically difficult than negotiations between a nation and
a firm. Third, if the ultimate goal of a developing country is to
stimulate foreign direct investment by private firms, then bar-
gaining with an industrialized nation is like bargaining with a
middleman, an inefficient approach. Fourth, a developing coun-
try should have more bargaining power in relation to a firm
than with the nation standing behind it. Finally, the ability of a
developing country to experiment and evaluate the success of
its economic initiatives with private firms is easier than judg-
ing the effects of compliance with broad treaties. Reichman and
Lange reason that "[p]rivate concessions vetted on a case-by-
case basis within a minimalist normative framework would
provide governments with a practical means of empirically as-
certaining the appropriate balance between legal incentives to
innovate and free competition in particular sectors of their
economies." 2 5
283. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.
284. See id. art. 3.
285. Reichman & Lange, supra note 4, at 27.
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B. ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NGOs
TO INSIST ON THE INTEGRITY OF TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement expressly states:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner con-
ducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations. ' s6
More recently, the WTO ministerial declaration at the Doha
ministerial meeting promised "to make positive efforts designed
to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-
developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic develop-
ment."2 ' A rational diplomatic strategy on behalf of the devel-
oping world would seek to assure the promise of Article 7 is
taken seriously by the industrialized world.
Although this Article outlines a minimalist enforcement
strategy, it insists on compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
Working within the TRIPS framework allows developing coun-
tries to insist on the protections provided by the agreement, in-
cluding freedom from undue unilateral pressure to strengthen
intellectual property laws. 28 For example, the United States
claims that it may still impose unilateral trade sanctions in
cases where the WTO dispute resolution framework is avail-
able.2" Developing countries must take advantage of available
international fora to insist that everyone plays within the rules
of the TRIPS Agreement. For example, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) has traditionally been receptive
to the concerns of developing countries; in fact, its unwilling-
ness to impose high minimum standards provided much of the
impetus behind the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Its im-
portance as a rule-making body may have diminished, but it
may still provide effective advocacy for developing countries
adopting a minimal compliance strategy with the TRIPS
Agreement. Several important NGOs have also staked posi-
tions contrary to firms and governments that push for maxi-
286. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7.
287. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 91, 2.
288. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64.
289. See Robert Pechman, Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual
Property: The United States "TRIPs" over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 179 (1998).
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mum enforcement.29°
The usefulness of a cohesive international strategy is illus-
trated in the recent compromise reached between owners of
patents in AIDS pharmaceuticals and the government of South
Africa.291 Although a maximalist view was pushed by the patent
owners and the U.S. government, pressure from NGOs, WIPO,
and the WTO itself resulted in a historic compromise on price
and availability of critically needed drugs.292 Having paid the
price of compliance with TRIPS, developing countries should
find themselves in a politically and morally attractive position.
Developing countries must find the right fora and right part-
ners to defend themselves from the inevitable maximalist de-
mands of intellectual property owners and the nations that ad-
vocate on their behalf, most importantly, the United States.
CONCLUSION
Crafting a rational intellectual property policy poses a
complex challenge for governments in developing countries.
Even when a clear economic objective can be identified, the
most effective course of conduct may be unclear. Sometimes a
policy can be crafted legislatively. Reducing the cost of comply-
ing with the patent sections of the TRIPS Agreement, for ex-
ample, lends itself to relatively clear legislative solutions. If a
country would like, however, to increase the level of its protec-
tion of trade secrets to attract foreign investment without in-
curring the administrative costs of patent law, it may find leg-
islation alone inadequate. An effective trade secret policy, and
probably an effective first sale doctrine, require a cooperative
judiciary and perhaps even a specialized intellectual property
court. A competent executive has a critical role to play too, not
only in facilitating the public/private initiatives described
above, but also in monitoring intellectual property issues that
290. Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 34 (2002)
(discussing role of groups like OXFAM, South African Treatment Action Cam-
paign, and Act Up).
291. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to
Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71 (2001).
292. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 91, 17 (declaration by the
WTO ministry "stress[ing] the importance we attach to implementation and
interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner supportive of public health,




might best be addressed through administrative action. Effec-
tive control over abusive rights holders through application of
antitrust principles or anti-biopiracy measures requires exper-
tise and an ability to coordinate not found in the legislative or
judicial branches.
Lack of governmental competence, rather than the express
language of the TRIPS Agreement, may pose the biggest obsta-
cle for developing countries that wish to shape their intellectual
property laws to minimize costs to consumers and local manu-
facturers, encourage local inventive activity, and facilitate bar-
gaining with foreign firms. If policy makers in developing coun-
tries do not understand the public welfare issues raised by
intellectual property law, if they respond in knee-jerk fashion
to outside pressure, and if corruption is pervasive, then no
amount of flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement will help them.
Prescribing a solution for systemic defects in governmental in-
stitutions is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth not-
ing existing initiatives to encourage self-interested thinking
about intellectual property issues by developing countries.
Duke University School of Law, for example, has been working
to establish a center for public/private initiatives after the
TRIPS Agreement.293 The University of Georgia School of Law
will be advising Palestinian law professors under a State
Department grant on intellectual property issues that will arise
if full statehood arrives. Finally, although it may be naive to
expect the U.S. government to side with developing countries in
disputes with American intellectual property owners,294 one
might hope that ongoing initiatives to promote democracy
around the world might encourage policy makers in developing
countries to approach all issues, including intellectual property
issues, from a standpoint of self-interested rationality.
293. David Lange, Forward: Public-Private Initiatives After TRIPS: Design-
ing a Global Agenda, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1998) (describing center
focused on fostering partnerships in China).
294. See Abbott, supra note 291, at 71-72 (noting role of U.S. government
negotiators in the South African AIDS drug crisis).
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